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CONSUMER PRIMACY: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR CONSUMER-CENTRIC BUSINESSES
Summer Kim*
Abstract
This Article challenges the conventional view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase shareholder value, arguing that
rather, corporate law should principally strive to ensure consumer
satisfaction in consumer-centric businesses. Consumer-centric businesses
are defined here as businesses in which consumers occupy a central role
in the creation and distribution of corporate value and risks. For example,
a consumer of a crowdfunded product does not take shares, but provides
capital and product-design feedback during the early and critical stages
of the product’s development. A consumer using a ridesharing app makes
significant contributions to building the platform and provides real-time
ratings and feedback regarding their experience, which are then used to
incentivize desirable behavior within the platform. A purchaser of a token
in an initial coin offering (ICO) purchases a medium of exchange that can
be used within a particular network, with the value of the token being
determined by the network’s success. In each of these examples,
consumers have taken on roles that are the functional equivalents of the
characteristics that legal theories of the firm have long relied upon to
*
© 2022 Summer Kim. Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of
Law: skim@law.uci.edu. I owe much thanks to Joshua Blank, Stephen Choi, Vic Fleischer,
and Stephen Lee for encouragement and suggestions during the early stages of this project.
I am also grateful to Jill Fisch, Dalie Jimenez, Alex Lee, Omri Marian, Sasha Natapoff, Emily
Taylor Poppe, Robert Thompson, and Andrew Tuch for reading earlier versions of this
Article and providing helpful comments. I have also benefitted from the opportunity to
present and receive feedback on this project at the 2020 AALS Annual Meeting in
Washington D.C. (panel on Rising Tensions Among Corporate Stakeholders), the 2019
Shuttle Symposium between Korea University and UCI Law, the 2019 Trans-Pacific
Business Law Dialogue hosted by the Korea Law Center at UCI Law, the IFABS 2019
Corporate Finance Conference, the 2019 Corporate and Securities Roundtable at Tulane Law
School, the 2019 BYU Winter Deals Conference, the 2019 Corporate Social Responsibility
Across the Atlantic Conference hosted by the University of Massachusetts Boston, the 2019
Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference hosted by the University of Auckland, an
invited seminar at the Center for Distributive Justice at Seoul National University, and the
Amity Symposium hosted by the Centre for Banking & Finance Law at the National
University of Singapore. Rob Adamson, Deborah Choi, Emily Croucher, Tianmei Ann
Huang and Kate Wetz provided extraordinary research assistance, Laura Kent-Jensen and
Kaitlynn Morgan and other members of the Utah Law Review and Matthew Perez provided
superb editorial assistance. I would also like to thank the students in my Corporate
Governance seminar at UC Irvine in the fall of 2018 for the opportunity to workshop an early
version of this work. Any errors are my own.

235

236

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

justify the law’s treatment of shareholders as owners and principals of
firms. Based on this observation, I argue that consumers in these and other
consumer-centric businesses should be provided with rights and
obligations (such as the right to vote, standing to sue, and participation
rights) commensurate to their contributions. In this Article, I show how
this consumer-oriented model of the firm, which I refer to as the consumer
primacy model, is useful as a mechanism to align corporate and societal
interests and to inject diversity, long-termism, accountability, and social
responsibility into the corporate boardroom, the lack of which has given
rise to long-standing critiques of corporate culture in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders and their investment capital were the fuel that drove the
remarkable growth of industrial firms in the twentieth century.1 In recognition of
such essential contributions, as well as the difficulty of protecting shareholders’
interests via contract, 2 a corporate law and governance framework developed to
protect shareholders and their capital investments. These protections included
disclosure and information rights, inspection rights, participation rights, voting
rights, fiduciary duty protections, and dividends.3 This bundle of legal shareholder
rights and protections came to be regarded as the foundation of a thriving capital
market,4 and this shareholder-oriented legal framework came to be known as the
shareholder primacy norm in corporate law.5
1
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 834 (1993) (“The Industrial Revolution was
distinguished by a shift to capital-intensive production . . . .”).
2
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A
Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 423 (1993). “It is desirable to maintain a
system of corporate governance in which fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to
shareholders because no suitable alternative means of protecting shareholders’ claims exist
other than by way of a judicially enforced regime of fiduciary duties. By contrast, the
obligations owed to other claimants can be enforced by contract because they are more
precisely defined than the obligations to shareholders.” Id.
3
See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216–
18 (1999) (discussing shareholders’ rights to vote, sell, or sue).
4
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1129, 1146 (1998) (arguing that dispersed ownership in large public
corporations can only arise in legal environments that provide adequate protections to
minority shareholders). The authors show that common law systems consistently outperform
civil law systems in terms of the depth and liquidity of their capital markets. Id. at 1132,
1147–48.
5
See Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy,” 2 ACCT., ECON. & L.
1, 1 (2012) (explaining how shareholder wealth maximization became the “proper goal of
corporate governance” in the 1970s); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23
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The shareholder primacy norm views the maximization of shareholder value as
the most efficient means of maximizing total corporate and, ultimately, societal
value.6 As famously asserted by Milton Friedman in 1970, the norm is based on the
understanding that it is the social responsibility of a business to increase its profits,
because increasing its profits also increases overall social welfare.7 But while profits
have been a reliable proxy for societal value in some contexts, there is growing
evidence of discord between profit-seeking and public interest. 8 This discord
prompts a reexamination of the shareholder primacy norm, which rests on the
presumed equivalence between societal and shareholder value.
Several recent examples have highlighted the harmful consequences of a
misalignment between profit and social welfare. In November 2020, the opioid
manufacturer Purdue Pharma LP (Purdue Pharma) admitted that it had marketed and
sold dangerous opioid products, despite having reason to believe these products were
J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) (discussing the various formulations of the shareholder primacy
norm).
6
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[A]s a consequence of both logic and experience, there
is convergence on a consensus that the best means to . . . the pursuit of aggregate social
welfare . . . is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests, and,
at least in direct terms, only to those interests.”).
7
Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine‐-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/
archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.
cc/X8GE-JYM7].
8
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 2003, 2015 (2003) (explaining how methods used to increase shareholder wealth
harms consumers, employees, suppliers, and others); Thomas Clarke, Accounting for Enron:
Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Interests, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 598, 604 (2005).
“[T]he relentless emphasis on the importance of shareholder value in recent times has created
the conditions for the disconnection of corporations such as Enron from their essential moral
underpinnings, encouraging them to concentrate exclusively on financial performance, and
to neglect not just the wider stakeholder interests of customers and employees, but the
essential interests of the economies and communities in which they operate.” Id.; Terence
Tse, Shareholder and Stakeholder Theory: After the Financial Crisis, 3 QUALITATIVE RSCH.
FIN. MKTS. 51, 53–55 (2011) (explaining how the pursuit of shareholder value maximization
through increasing corporate size and cash flows led banks, including Lehman Brothers, to
overly rely on credit markets and undertake questionable risks, which ultimately led to the
2008–2009 financial crisis); Frederick H. Alexander, Saving Investors from Themselves:
How Stockholder Primacy Harms Everyone, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 303, 306–08 (2017)
(discussing how corporate decision-makers in the “free market” created by shareholder
primacy must pursue every negative-sum opportunity with other stakeholders in order to give
shareholders the greatest return to the detriment of all parties involved); Jacob M. Rose,
Corporate Directors and Social Responsibility: Ethics Versus Shareholder Value, 73 J. BUS.
ETHICS 319, 319–20 (2007) (finding that directors consistently and knowingly give up
corporate social responsibility that affects social welfare in order to increase shareholder
value because they believe current corporate law requires them to take shareholder valuemaximizing actions).
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being diverted to abusers.9 In 2019 alone, nearly 50,000 people died from opioidinvolved overdoses in the United States.10 As another example, in January 2021, the
Boeing Company (Boeing) was charged with fraud conspiracy for failing to be
transparent about a defect in the manufacture of its 737 Max airplane that led to 346
passenger deaths.11 As stated by Acting Assistant Attorney General David P. Burns
of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division: “Boeing’s employees chose the path
of profit over candor by concealing material information from the FAA [Federal
Aviation Administration] concerning the operation of its 737 Max airplane and
engaging in an effort to cover up their deception.”12 The Purdue Pharma and Boeing
examples, and numerous others like them, illustrate how putting profits first can lead
to socially irresponsible and disastrous results.
But if profit is not a guaranteed path to socially responsible business, then what
is? In this Article, I argue that prioritizing consumers’ interests is the better path for
a growing subset of firms, and I define and refer to this subset of firms as consumercentric businesses. Consumer-centric businesses include all businesses in which
consumers are more than mere purchasers and occupy, more so than any other
stakeholder, a central role in the creation and distribution of corporate value and
risks. Instagram, the photo- and video-sharing social networking platform, now
owned by Facebook,13 is a prime example of a consumer-centric business. The core
value of Instagram’s business, which was projected to generate $18.16 billion in ad
revenue in 2021, is derived from the 50 billion photo and video posts contributed by
more than 1.074 billion users on the platform. 14 Instagram launched with only
$500,000 of seed funding and had just 13 employees when it became a billion-dollar
company.15

9
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to
Fraud and Kickback Conspiracies (Nov. 24, 2020) (on file with author),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/opioid-manufacturer-purdue-pharma-pleads-guilty-fraudand-kickback-conspiracies [https://perma.cc/BE9F-FQM4].
10
Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE (Mar. 11, 2021) (on file with
author), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://per
ma.cc/MA5T-N6Z2].
11
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Boeing Charged with 737 Max Fraud Conspiracy and
Agrees to Pay over $2.5 Billion (Jan. 7, 2021) (on file with author),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-payover-25-billion [https://perma.cc/EE4U-CHK8].
12
Id.
13
Facebook to Acquire Instagram, FACEBOOK (Apr. 9, 2012),
https://about.fb.com/news/2012/04/facebook-to-acquire-instagram/ [https://perma.cc/72VV
-5WNZ]; Laurie Segall, Facebook Acquires Instagram for $1 Billion, CNN MONEY (last
updated Apr. 9, 2012, 3:19 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2012/04/09/technology/facebook_
acquires_instagram/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4T9C-MP8W].
14
Data current as of June 28, 2021. Instagram by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics
& Fun Facts, OMNICORE (last updated Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/
instagram-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/N83H-ULAN].
15
SARAH FRIER, NO FILTER: THE INSIDE STORY OF INSTAGRAM 15, 62 (2020).
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In support of a paradigm shift from shareholder primacy to consumer primacy
for certain firms, I first begin by identifying the three distinct characteristics that
have historically been used to justify shareholders’ primacy status under the
shareholder primacy norm, and by referring to the group that embodies these
characteristics as primary stakeholders. First, primary stakeholders provide core
inputs that create a significant stake in the business.16 Second, primary stakeholders
are vulnerable to opportunistic and oppressive behaviors that are otherwise not fully
addressed by contracts or existing regulations. 17 Third, primary stakeholders’
interests are a reliable metric of collective corporate and societal value.18 Having
identified the three primary stakeholder characteristics, I then define consumercentric businesses as businesses in which consumers, more so than any other
stakeholder, hold these primary stakeholder characteristics.
This Article is motivated by the observation that while these primary
stakeholder characteristics were emblematic of shareholders in an industrial society,
they are increasingly more suitable descriptors of consumers in our postindustrial
world. Clinging too rigidly to the shareholder primacy norm in an increasingly
consumer-centric world is therefore descriptively inaccurate and, more pressingly,
has led to a growing misalignment between corporate and social objectives. This
disconnect has also widened the inequalities in our society by privileging capital
investment over other inputs that add just as much, if not more, value to businesses
and to society.19
Notably, consumers’ contributions of both tangible and intangible capital are
increasingly becoming the key drivers of growth in our postindustrial world.20 The

16

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
18
See infra Section II.A.3.
19
See Thomas Clarke, Walter Jarvis & Soheyla Gholamshahi, The Impact of Corporate
Governance on Compounding Inequality: Maximising Shareholder Value and Inflating
Executive Pay, 63 CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCT., 2019, at 1, 2 (explaining how the focus
on maximizing shareholder value systemically compounds inequality by dedicating
corporations to serving a small elite of owners and managers while dispossessing workers
from the same prosperity).
20
This acknowledgement that our increasingly data-driven economy cannot exist but
for the data contributed by users and consumers forms the basis of the idea of a “data
dividend” that has been proposed by academics and policymakers. See generally Dan Vesset,
Henry D. Morris & John F. Gantz, Capturing the $1.6 Trillion Data Dividend, IDC 1 (2014).
Former U.S. presidential candidate Andrew Yang inspired the data dividend project which
seeks to help Americans gain ownership and control of their personal data. Who We Are,
DATA DIVIDEND PROJECT, https://www.datadividendproject.com/aboutus [https://perma.cc/
MLX8-VL5N?type=image] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021). See About the Data Dividend Project,
DATA DIVIDEND PROJECT, https://www.datadividendproject.com/manifesto [https://perma.
cc/5CVB-PKQE] (last visited May 14, 2021) (noting that the consumer data brokering
industry is a $200 billion industry); see also Yakov Feygin, Hanlin Li, Chirag Lala, Brent
Hecht, Nicholas Vincent, Luisa Scarcella & Matthew Prewitt, A Data Dividend that Works:
17
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misuse of these contributions has led to privacy concerns, manipulation, fraud, and
other vulnerabilities that are notoriously difficult to address fully via contract and
external regulation. 21 Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that consumer
satisfaction is a more reliable metric of the value and harm that corporations confer
upon our society. 22 Relating back to Purdue Pharma and Boeing, the arguments
made in this Article rest on the assertion that patient well-being and passenger safety
are better measures of these businesses’ overall value than their price-to-earnings
ratios.
These developments suggest that we need a new model of the firm for
consumer-centric businesses—one that does not view consumers merely as sources
of shareholder value extraction and instead treats consumers as the owners and
controllers of the value they create. This model of the firm in which consumers
migrate from the periphery to the core of corporate governance is referred to here as
the consumer primacy model.
The proposed consumer primacy model would first require companies to selfcertify as to whether they are a consumer-centric business.23 The scope of companies
that are subject to this self-certification requirement would depend on the
implementation strategy adopted. 24 Second, any business that self-certifies as a
consumer-centric business would be required to appoint a consumer representative
(or an equivalent) to serve on its governing body.25 This consumer representative
would be accountable to consumers, meaning that they would represent consumers’
interests and owe fiduciary duties to them.26 Third, the consumer primacy model
would require consumer-centric businesses to routinely report on their consumerwelfare metrics, as determined by the consumer representative in consultation with
the governing body.27
Steps Toward Building an Equitable Data Economy, BERGGRUEN INST. 5–6, 21 (2021),
https://www.berggruen.org/ideas/articles/a-data-dividend-that-works-steps-toward-building
-an-equitable-data-economy/ [https://perma.cc/RL64-TXCK] (outlining an immediately
implementable data dividends plan); Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, State of the
State 2019 Address (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.capradio.org/articles/2019/02/12/text-andanalysis-state-of-the-state-2019/ [https://perma.cc/6XJP-XGY8] (“California’s consumers
should also be able to share in the wealth that is created from their data.”). The data dividend
proposals’ focus on providing consumers with financial rights is complementary to this
Article’s focus on providing consumers with governance rights.
21
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 382 (2016) (describing the risks in under-regulation as well
as overregulation by comparing data protection legislation between the U.S. and E.U.).
22
See Donald R. Lehmann, Metrics for Making Marketing Matter, 68 J. MKTG. 73, 74
(2004) (highlighting the importance of attempting to understand the relationship between
customer satisfaction and firm value despite the difficulty of measuring and developing such
a value chain).
23
See infra Section IV.A.1.
24
See infra Section IV.B.
25
See infra Section IV.A.2.
26
See infra Section IV.A.3.
27
See infra Section IV.A.4.

2022]

CONSUMER PRIMACY

241

To demonstrate how the proposal would work in practice, we return to the
example of Boeing. If Boeing were to certify as a consumer-centric business, 28
Boeing would then be required to appoint a consumer representative to its board.
One of the primary responsibilities of this consumer representative would have been
to consider the consumer-welfare effects of the company’s business decisions, and
their presence likely would have served to counterbalance the profit-above-safety
attitude that was later revealed to have permeated the organization.29 Furthermore,
consumers would have been able to bring breach of fiduciary duty claims against
the consumer representative for the injuries they suffered as a result of the
company’s disregard for its passengers’ safety and lives.
The consumer primacy model for consumer-centric businesses is expected to
create a more efficient and just society. The proposed model is more efficient
because it transfers some of the ownership and control of the consumer-centric
business to the parties whose interests are most aligned with long-term corporate
and societal interests—the consumers. The model is also more just because it
adheres to the basic principle of mutuality: that businesses should acknowledge and
serve the stakeholders who contribute the most to, and suffer the most from, their
activities.30
The consumer primacy model recognizes the evolution of the consumer from a
passive to an active participant in our contemporary society. 31 It seeks to shift
businesses’ perceptions of the consumer toward viewing the consumer as a source
from whom to invite input, insight, and guidance, rather than as one from which to
extract value. The consumer primacy model also recognizes that consumers’ own
perceptions of their role within business and society, too, must change.32 By naming
and treating consumers as primary stakeholders, the law can be used to instill a
greater sense of social responsibility in consumers and, accordingly, in the
businesses with which they engage.
28

Notably, Boeing’s corporate value statement opens with: “At Boeing, we are honored
to serve all the people who rely on our products and services every day,” suggesting a
consumer orientation. Our Values, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/principles/values.page
[https://perma.cc/7SJG-XJJL] (last visited May 14, 2021).
29
See generally Press Release, Dep’t Just., supra note 11.
30
For a discussion of the theory and practice of mutuality in business, see PUTTING
PURPOSE INTO PRACTICE, THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUALITY (Colin Mayer & Bruno Roche
eds., 2021).
31
Minna Lammi & Mika Pantzar, The Data Economy: How Technological Change Has
Altered the Role of the Citizen-Consumer, 59 TECH. SOCIETY 1, 4–5 (2019) (emphasizing the
consumer’s new role in modern, digitalized society).
32
See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 253, 283–85 (2009) (explaining how corporate law fails to provide consumers
a mechanism to overcome collective action problems inhibiting socially responsible
consumption); Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The World We Need, in CO-OPERATIVES
IN A POST-GROWTH ERA: CREATING CO-OPERATIVE ECONOMICS 61, 71 (Sonja Novkovic &
Tom Webb eds., 2014) (“Consumerism is almost certainly the greatest obstacle to any
attempt to make major reductions in carbon emissions.”).
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The shareholder primacy model that has permeated contemporary corporate
law has thus far relied on consumers to operate on a borrow-more-to-buy-more
model, which leads to increased shareholder wealth, but at the cost of greater
consumer debt and societal waste.33 While it might have been useful to rely on this
growth-focused model in the early stages of industrial society, there is growing
evidence to suggest that seeking the illusory “more” is becoming less sustainable.34
As an alternative, the consumer primacy model offers a sustainable approach to
corporate governance by introducing the cooperative values to the existing corporate
law framework.35
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss the shareholder
primacy model and how it became cemented as the norm in corporate law. I explain
why and how treating shareholders as primary stakeholders, and giving them special
privileges associated with this primacy status, was an important foundation for our
industrial society. I extract from this discussion the primary stakeholder
characteristics—i.e., the characteristics of shareholders that entitled them to primacy
status in the eyes of corporate law. In Part III, I describe the ways in which
consumers increasingly (and shareholders decreasingly) embody the primary
stakeholder characteristics in contemporary firms, and I label such firms as
consumer-centric businesses. In Part IV, I outline the consumer primacy model for
consumer-centric businesses. I describe how a shift to consumer primacy can be
achieved and why it is socially desirable, and I address counterarguments. I conclude
in Part V by recognizing that adoption of the consumer primacy model for consumercentric businesses would pave the way for a more dynamic corporate law framework
that allocates rights and protections according to the substance, rather than the form,
of stakeholders’ relationships to one another, the enterprise, and society.

33

VICKI ROBIN & JOE DOMINGUEZ, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE 18 (2018) (referring
to consumerism as “a twentieth-century invention of our industrial society, created at a time
when encouraging people to buy more goods was seen as necessary for continued economic
growth”).
34
See JOHN R. EHRENFELD, SUSTAINABILITY BY DESIGN: A SUBVERSIVE STRATEGY
FOR TRANSFORMING OUR CONSUMER CULTURE (2009). See also KATE RAWORTH,
DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS: SEVEN WAYS TO THINK LIKE A 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIST 9 (2017)
(explaining that one powerful depiction of this “tipping point” takes the form of a doughnut).
According to Raworth’s model, the inner ring of the doughnut is a social foundation of wellbeing that no one should fall below, and the outer ring is an ecological ceiling of planetary
pressure that we should not go beyond. Beyond the two rings’ boundaries lies a “safe and
just space for humanity.” Id.
35
See COOPERATIVES IN A POST-GROWTH ERA: CREATING CO-OPERATIVE ECONOMICS
(Sonja Novkovic & Tom Webb eds., 2014) (discussing cooperatives as a feasible alternative
to driving a more environmentally sustainable and equitable economic system to the current
private interest-focused model).
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II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND OTHER MODELS OF THE FIRM
The doctrine of shareholder value provides that public corporations are owned
by shareholders and that the corporation’s purpose is to maximize shareholder
wealth.36 The doctrine of shareholder value has evolved into a norm—referred to as
the shareholder primacy norm in corporate law—which shapes how we think about
corporate purpose and corporate governance.37 This Part begins with an outline of
the origins and development of the shareholder primacy norm. It then points to the
signs of the norm’s erosion and examines the currently available alternatives to the
shareholder primacy norm.
A. Shareholder Primacy and Shareholder-Owned Enterprise
1. Shareholder Stakes
In the industrial era of the United States, when investment capital was scarce,
the ability to raise capital from numerous and dispersed investors was essential to
our nation’s survival and growth. As John Coffee explains: “As a debtor nation
facing the need to develop highly capital-intensive industries . . . the United States
was more dependent upon foreign capital, and it had to strive harder to convince
remote foreign investors of the adequacy of the safeguards taken to protect their
investments.”38
Many of the primary safeguards stemmed from the legal system. In fact, the
influential work of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert W. Vishny (which spawned the expansive “law and finance” literature)
views legal protections of minority shareholders as a precondition to dispersed
ownership of public corporations. 39 Another shareholder-value-enhancing
mechanism, incentivized by favorable tax treatment, 40 is performance-based
compensation, which has been used to align managerial and shareholder interests.
This shareholder-oriented legal framework came to be known as the shareholder
primacy norm in corporate law.41

36

LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 2 (2012) (“According to the doctrine
of shareholder value, public corporations ‘belong’ to their shareholders, and they exist for
one purpose only, to maximize shareholders’ wealth.”).
37
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
38
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2001).
39
See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40
See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation,
TAX POL’Y & ECONOMY 1, 11 (2000).
41
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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One judicially recognized exception to shareholder primacy arises in the case
of insolvent firms.42 When a firm is insolvent (or near insolvent), it is the creditors
who are most eager to see that the firm survives so that their outstanding obligations
will be, even if only partially, repaid. Therefore, when a firm approaches the “zone
of insolvency,” its creditors step into the shoes of its shareholders under Delaware
law.43 In these exceptional cases, creditors are seen as enjoying primacy status.
The general rule and its exception both aim to attribute principal status to the
party whose interest is best aligned with the interests of the entire entity. It is because
shareholders (and in limited cases, creditors) are presumed to have the greatest stake
in the corporation’s fate that they are given primacy status under corporate law.44 As
such, in cases where a non-shareholder stakeholder has the greatest stake in the
corporation, primary status should be transferred from the shareholders to that
stakeholder.
2. Shareholder Vulnerabilities
Shareholder primacy rests not only upon efficiency-based arguments but also
upon notions of fairness. Some consider shareholders to be the most susceptible to
mistreatment and oppression by the managers to whom they cede control, arguing
that this susceptibility gives rise to a moral obligation to protect the shareholder.45
We use the term “equity” to refer to the value of shares issued by an enterprise, as
was articulated in an early 1824 case, Wood v. Dummer.46
42
See, e.g., Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 607, 610, 612–13 (2007) (noting that creditors become the primary residual risk bearers
in insolvent firms and should be the primary beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties in
such circumstances).
43
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). Chancellor Allen’s famous footnote 55 in
the Credit Lyonnais case (and concretized in the Product Resources decision) first introduced
this concept of creditors as residual claimants, which had the legal significance of fiduciary
duties being owed to creditors of insolvent companies. Id.; see Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v.
NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790–91 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“When a firm has reached the
point of insolvency, it is settled that under Delaware law, the firm’s directors are said to owe
fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors.”).
44
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (“[S]hareholders
retain plenary authority to guide the fate of a corporate enterprise because . . . they have the
greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-making.”).
45
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Economics
Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 331, 334 (2014) (“[F]iduciary duties are owed solely to
residual claimants because they are the group that faces the most severe set of contracting
problems with respect to defining the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by
officers and directors.”).
46
Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 439–40 (D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944) (“The
stockholders have no right to any thing but the residuum of the capital stock, after payment

2022]

CONSUMER PRIMACY

245

Among shareholders, the minority shareholder is seen as the party that is most
deserving of corporate law protections because it relies upon trust rather than explicit
contractual protections when dealing with the enterprise.47 In the event this trust is
breached, courts have stepped in to fill any gaps left unaddressed by the contracts
by making inferences about the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders.48
Minority-oppression rules (such as heightened fiduciary duty and statutory
provisions for minority squeeze-outs) recognize that minority shareholders,
particularly in privately held corporations, deserve special protections due to the
ease with which the majority can oppress the minority.49 In this way, the level of
protection offered has been tied to the level of a beneficiary’s vulnerability. Thus,
as the party most vulnerable to oppression changes from the shareholder to the
consumer, it is arguable that the consumer should become the beneficiary of the
special protections that had previously attached to vulnerable shareholders.
3. Shareholder Value Metrics
The shareholder primacy norm has also been favored for its ease and utility as
a measurement and accountability mechanism. Shareholder value can be reduced to
a single number (i.e., stock price),50 which can be compared across firms and time
periods, and thus reliably be used as a metric to measure managers’ performance.51
The market value criterion has been praised for obviating the difficulties of
considering individual and heterogeneous stockholder utility functions, while
leading to the result that each stockholder would have wanted.52
A related justification is that shareholders’ interests, unlike other stakeholders’
interests, are comparatively homogeneous and are thus easier to synthesize. Even
acknowledging that not all shareholders are alike, some scholars have argued that
they are more alike than any other stakeholder group, as all presumably want the
of all the debts of the bank. The funds in their hands, therefore, have an equity attached to
them, in favour of the creditors, which it is against conscience to resist.”).
47
Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning
(or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 912 (2005)
(“Because close corporation owners are frequently linked by family or other personal
relationships, there is often an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the sense
that contractual protection is needed.”).
48
See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564 (N.C. 1983); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663–64 (Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
49
See Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369, 377–78, 389, 398 (2011).
50
See Alexander, supra note 8 at 307 (noting that directors are beholden to shareholders,
and in current markets, “the strongest indicator of [share]holder return remains the current
stock price,” whether that value is created in the short- or long-term).
51
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986) (“[A] single objective goal like profit
maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair
and reasonable accommodation of all affected interests . . . .”).
52
EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THEORY OF FINANCE 69 (1972).
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highest possible return on their investment. 53 Indeed, the main criticism lodged
against alternatives to shareholder primacy, such as the stakeholder model that will
be later discussed, has been that requiring directors to pander to a variety of interests
will lead to a diffusion of their focus.54 As consumer satisfaction metrics become a
more reliable measure of corporate value and, more importantly, societal value, we
need to look to these metrics as potential measures of corporate value.
4. Summary
To summarize, shareholders have enjoyed primacy status within the corporate
law framework for a number of reasons. First, shareholders provided the input
(investment capital) that was most valued by industrial enterprise, and treating
shareholders as primary stakeholders encouraged them to provide these valuable
investments. Shareholder interests were also seen as being most aligned with those
of the enterprise. Second, shareholders were regarded as the most appropriate
beneficiaries of corporate law protections because they were seen as not having the
benefit of contractual and external protections that other stakeholders were
presumed to have, and thus required the protection of corporate law. Third,
shareholder value (measured by stock price) was seen as a readily available, accurate,
and easily comparable measure of firm value that could be used to hold managers
accountable.
These three characteristics are referred to here as the primary stakeholder
characteristics. While each has been used to defend shareholders’ status as primary
stakeholders, none of them is wed to any particular stakeholder being the primary
stakeholder and could easily lend itself to a more dynamic view of corporate
governance, as further discussed in Part V.
The Three Primary Stakeholder Characteristics
Stakes
Primary stakeholders provide the input that is most valued by
the firm, and primary stakeholders’ interests are aligned with
those of the firm
Vulnerability
Primary stakeholders are the most susceptible to
mistreatment and oppression
Measurability
Primary stakeholders’ interests are easily measurable

53

See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder
Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 1007 (2013)
(“Shareholders in business corporations around the world today are generally investors
whose primary, and typically only, interest in the firm is to obtain a financial return.”).
54
See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 445 (“The growing view today is
that meaningful direct worker voting participation in corporate affairs tends to produce
inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak boards.”).
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Having established the three primary stakeholder characteristics, this Article next
identifies the subset of firms in which consumers, more so than any other stakeholder,
satisfy the primary stakeholder characteristics and charts out a path toward consumer
primacy for these firms.
B. Shifting Grounds of Shareholder Primacy
The shareholder primacy norm is based on the understanding that maximizing
shareholder wealth maximizes the corporation’s total value and, ultimately, societal
value.55 However, this conventional wisdom that shareholder interest is aligned with
collective interest has recently come under fire.56
To begin with, there are concerns about shareholders’ increasingly passive role
in corporate governance.57 While those concerns have been countered with accounts
of increasing shareholder activism, especially on the part of institutional investors,58
there have been growing concerns that these institutional investors are exercising
their power in ways that value short-term, private benefits over long-term, collective
gains. 59 Adding to this concern of short-termism is the proliferation of highfrequency trading, under which the duration of share ownership is reduced to mere
milliseconds.60 As shareholders become more passive, more focused on the short
term, and more transient, it can no longer be assumed that maximizing shareholder
wealth reliably maximizes the corporation’s total value, especially when taking a
view toward sustainable corporate value.
55

See Friedman, supra note 7.
See supra note 8.
57
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 521–22 (1990) (“The managers — the current officers and directors — pick the directors,
and the shareholders rubberstamp the managers’ choices . . . . Collective actions problems,
which arise because each shareholder owns a small fraction of a company’s stock, explain
why shareholders can’t be expected to care.”); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy,
10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1034 (2013) (“[C]orporations have grown in scale and
complexity and shareholders have been transformed into passive investors relying on
professional managers . . . .”).
58
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1042 (2007) (discussing the activism of
public pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds).
59
STOUT, supra note 36, at 94 (describing how activist hedge funds’ strategies are
designed to raise short-term share prices without creating long-term wealth); see also
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 711–715 (2010). For an account of activist shareholders, see Iman
Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255,
1290–92 (2008).
60
See, e.g., Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (July–Aug. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/what-good-are-shareholders [https://perma.
cc/XE2S-M4BT] (“In a more recent development, high-frequency traders whose holding
periods can sometimes be measured in milliseconds now account for as much as 70% of
daily volume on the NYSE.”).
56
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There have also been concerns that shareholders’ common ownership (referred
to as horizontal shareholding), resulting from institutional investors’ significant
investment stakes, could have anticompetitive effects. 61 Also relevant to this
discussion are the accounts of empty voting, where shareholders holding short
positions in a firm may exercise their vote in self-interested ways that are adverse to
the overall interests of the firm.62 Indeed, some shareholders benefit outright when
the corporation suffers a loss. For example, financial fraud benefits those investors
who buy and hold shares until the fraud is discovered, but has an overall detrimental
effect on the corporation and society.63
One response to these concerns is that there are sufficient pro-social
shareholders to outweigh those with antisocial tendencies. Here, the pro-social group
usually refers to long-term value investors. However, the presumed pro-social
tendencies of long-term shareholders have also come into question. In “The Uneasy
Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders,” Jesse Fried challenges the
presumption that serving long-term shareholders will generate more value over time
than serving short-term shareholders.64 Fried explains that long-term shareholders
do not represent the interests of all of the firm’s shareholders when the volume of
repurchases and equity issuances is high, when managers’ ability to exploit
information asymmetries is substantial, and when the difficulty of engaging in costly
61

See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects
of Common Ownership 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1558 (2018) (concluding that there are
“anticompetitive incentives due to common ownership links at the market level”). See also
José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition, FIN.
MGMT., 2021, at 1, 8 (discussing anticompetitive effects in the context of common
ownership); Einer Elhauge, The Greatest Anticompetitive Threat of Our Time: Fixing the
Horizontal Shareholding Problem, PROMARKET (Jan. 7, 2019), https://promarket.org/2019
/01/07/greatest-anticompetitive-threat-horizontal-shareholding/
[https://perma.cc/9H8LBBQJ] (“The big three index fund families (Black Rock, Vanguard, and State Street) alone
own 18 percent of shares and cast an estimated 24 percent of votes in publicly-traded firms,
and own 20 percent of shares and cast an estimated 26 percent of votes at S&P 500 firms.”).
But see generally Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to
Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate Governance 1–37 (N.Y.U. Sch. L. & Econ.
Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-05, 2017) (critiquing the arguments put forth by
Azar and other authors, especially in the airline industry).
62
See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 BUS. LAW. 1011, 1015–21 (2006)
(discussing the pros, cons, and prevalence of empty voting); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1253 (2008) (“The most
troubling pathology of complexity is the system’s inability to provide vote verification and
an end-to-end audit trail.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk:
How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55
VILL. L. REV. 93, 98 (2010) (discussing the abuse of the “one share one vote” rule through
empty voting).
63
STOUT, supra note 36, at 68.
64
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE
L.J. 1554 (2015) (arguing that long-term shareholders can destroy value equivalent to shortterm shareholders).
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price manipulation is great.65 Fried concludes: “Neither short-term nor long-term
shareholder interests can be counted on to align with the interests of non-shareholder
parties.”66
Of greater concern is the evidence that even well-intended shareholders often
cannot be counted on to realize their good intentions. In Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, Einer Elhauge argues that even shareholders who have
pro-social tendencies act against their own pro-social inclinations when they lack
sufficient information.67 Lynn Stout, in Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws
Make Good People, introduces findings from experimental research that shows that
people will act pro-socially only when they are told others will behave pro-socially,
when pro-social decisions provide greater benefits, and when they are asked to
behave pro-socially.68 As Stout shows, the opposite holds true in capital markets—
shareholder primacy ideology teaches shareholders that investors (and managers, on
shareholders’ behalf) should maximize share price at whatever cost, that others will
behave selfishly, and that selfish investing creates social value.69
These recent findings suggest that we have been clinging to a norm based on
an increasingly unsupported equivalence between shareholder and societal value.
Shareholders continue to be treated as primary stakeholders because of their
presumed pro-social tendencies even when their true nature may be inconsistent with
these presumptions. This has led to a growing misalignment between corporate
purpose and social purpose. It has also widened the inequalities in our society by
privileging investor-provided capital input over other types of input.70 As one data
point, the largest shareholders of Amazon and Walmart grew $116 billion richer
during the COVID-19 pandemic, even as many consumers were left unemployed
and with diminished spending power.71 These shifts suggest that we must consider
alternative views, which are surveyed in the next subpart.

65

Id. at 1615–20.
Id. at 1621; see also id. at 1564 (“The fundamental problem with focusing on either
short-term or long-term shareholder interests is that neither type of shareholder interest
reflects the value flowing to both the firm’s current and future shareholders.”).
67
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 796–802 (2005).
68
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
59–68 (2010).
69
Id. See also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
70
See Clarke, supra note 8.
71
See Molly Kinder & Laura Stateler, Amazon and Walmart Have Raked in Billions in
Additional Profits During the Pandemic, and Shared Almost None of It with Their Workers,
AVENUE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2020/12/22/
amazon-and-walmart-have-raked-in-billions-in-additional-profits-during-the-pandemic-and
-shared-almost-none-of-it-with-their-workers/ [https://perma.cc/PHA3-7BC4].
66
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C. Alternatives to Shareholder Primacy
The shareholder primacy norm served us remarkably well during most of the
twentieth century, as established above in Section II.A. However, there is growing
evidence of inefficiencies in the shareholder-owned enterprise and its harmful
effects on our society, as discussed above in Section II.B. Notwithstanding these
shortcomings, the shareholder primacy norm has endured, and some scholars view
its continued dominance as attributable to the absence of any superior alternatives.72
Here, I discuss the currently available alternatives before turning to the proposed
consumer primacy alternative in Parts III and IV.
1. Employee Primacy
Among non-shareholder stakeholders, employees have received significant
attention as possible contenders to shareholders for primacy status.73 Margaret Blair
and Mark Roe emphasize the importance of the employee role in corporate
governance by finding that (1) human capital is as important as physical capital in
creating value; (2) the relationship between employees and companies functions
under different rules and norms; and (3) boardroom decisions affect the daily lives
and financial security of employees. 74 A similar view was expressed by Clyde
Summers in a manuscript contemplating codetermination—a system of corporate
governance under which employees, along with shareholders, can vote for
representatives on a corporation’s board of directors—in the United States.75 More
recently, Matthew Bodie and Grant Hayden have argued for a model allowing shared
governance between shareholders and employees, 76 and George Georgiev has

72

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 439 (defending the shareholder-oriented
view of corporate governance through the failure of alternatives).
73
See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008) (defending employee primacy
in corporate governance through law and economics arguments as well as civic
republicanism); Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law
Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1751 (1990)
(“Employee ownership of enterprise has become a prominent focus of public policy and
private action both in the United States and abroad.”).
74
MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1–2 (1999).
75
Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems
and Potentials, 4 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982) (“[T]he employees may
have made a much greater investment in the enterprise by their years of service, may have
much less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise
than many of the stockholders.”).
76
Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2453–62 (2020).
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identified human capital management (HCM)77 as an anchor concept that could be
used by corporations to incorporate more worker considerations into U.S. corporate
governance. 78 Using the primary stakeholder characteristics developed in this
Article, it can be said that these theories of employee primacy highlight the cases
where employees embody two of the three primary stakeholder characteristics—
stakes and vulnerabilities.
2. Director Primacy
Stephen Bainbridge argues that director primacy is a more accurate view of
corporate governance.79 Indeed, the General Corporation Law of Delaware, which
is widely accepted as the preeminent jurisdiction for business formation within the
United States, declares that the business and affairs of every corporation shall be
managed by, or under the direction of, the board.80 Others have suggested that the
group actually in power is not the directors but the chief executives.81

77

Economist and Nobel laureate Gary Becker popularized the term human capital
management (HCM), which refers to a set of practices that views workers as productive
assets that are key to delivering long-term firm value. George S. Georgiev, The Human
Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 95 TUL. L. REV. 639, 644–45 (2021).
78
Id. at 639–40.
79
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547–50 (2002).
80
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2021).
81
See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM. 117, 117 (1988) (“Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has
been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system
of dominance by the managers, dubbed ‘managerialism.’”); Steven A. Ramirez, The Special
Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 345, 353–54 (2007) (documenting the movement of corporate governance towards a CEO
primacy model); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2008)
(arguing that the status quo is “CEO primacy––governance by managers largely for their
own benefit”); Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public Board, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2013) (“CEOs and other executives [rather than boards] came to
dominate the real-world control of the corporation.”). But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1039–42 (2010) (describing the declining powers of
CEOs); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economy Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989) (noting that the managerialist theory of
corporate law, which “put corporate management groups at the large corporation’s strategic
center,” recently disappeared).
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3. Shared Primacy and Stakeholder Models
Robert Thompson points to the multiplicity of primacy theories as evidence of
the limits of the explanatory power of any one primacy theory.82 Instead, he develops
an alternative theory based on shared power among shareholders, directors, and
officers.83
In a similar spirit, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory
draws from the insight that financial capital is just one of many essential
contributions that firms accept from stakeholders. 84 Under the team production
theory, the directors of a corporation’s board are the “mediating hierarchs” who
balance the ex-post demands of all the stakeholders who have made essential
contributions to the firm. 85 According to Blair and Stout, measures such as
eliminating staggered boards and weakening anti-takeover measures make it
difficult for the board to serve this role and thus deter non-shareholder stakeholders
from making firm-specific contributions.86
Blair and Stout’s team protection theory can be seen as one strain of the
stakeholder model, which regards all stakeholders—not only shareholders but also
directors, employees, consumers, suppliers, the state, community members, and
future generations—as beneficiaries of the corporation. 87 Constituency statutes,
which require directors to serve the interests of multiple stakeholders, are one
legislative expression of the stakeholder model,88 and benefit corporation legislation
is another.89
According to Edward Freeman, the term stakeholder first appeared in an
internal memo at the Stanford Research Institute, now SRI International, Inc. (SRI),
in 1963 and was intended to generalize the notion that the stockholder was not the
only group to whom management need be responsive. 90 Freeman defines the
stakeholder very broadly as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected
by, the achievement of a corporation’s purpose.” 91 Under this definition,
82

Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71
BUS. LAW. 381, 383 (2016).
83
Id.
84
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 250, 253.
87
See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
52 (1984) (“[I]f business organizations are to be successful in the current and future
environment then executives must take multiple stakeholder groups into account.”).
88
See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 16 (1992).
89
See Tiffany M. Burba, To “B” or Not to “B”: Duties of Directors and Rights of
Stakeholders in Benefit Corporations, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147, 158–159 (2017)
(comparing benefit corporation legislation to other constituency statutes).
90
FREEMAN, supra note 87, at 31. Relying on the theory, SRI developed systems to
measure the satisfaction of these key groups as input into the corporate planning process. Id.
91
Id. at vi.
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stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks,
environmentalists, government, and any other group that can not only help or hurt
the corporation but also be helped or be hurt by the corporation.92
Such a broad definition of stakeholders, however, has contributed to a
deepening divide between shareholders and other stakeholders in the allocation of
decision-making power within the firm. Under a broad definition of stakeholder like
Freeman’s, even adversaries (such as competitors or criminals who commit fraud
against the firm) would be considered stakeholders.93 And while stakeholder models
have been more widely embraced in recent years by business and legal
communities,94 including through the growing calls for mandatory adoption of the
public benefit corporation form,95 stakeholder models have also been criticized for
lacking empirical support and for attendant difficulties of measurement and
implementation.96
4. The Absent Consumer
The aforementioned alternatives to shareholder primacy have largely ignored
an important corporate constituent: the consumer. One exception is David Yosifon’s
92

Id.
Id. at 53 (“As unsavory as it is to admit that such ‘illegitimate’ groups [such as
terrorists] have a stake in our business, from the standpoint of strategic management, it must
be done. Strategies must be put in place to deal with terrorists if they can substantially affect
the operations of the business.”).
94
See, e.g., Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose BLACKROCK
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/M648-CGJV] (“To prosper over time, every company must not only
deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.
Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees,
customers, and the communities in which they operate.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Implications
of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156, 1158 (1993) (evaluating the
importance of the stakeholder model); James E. Post, Lee E. Preston & Sybille Sachs,
Managing the Extended Enterprise: The New Stakeholder View, 45 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 6
(2002) (developing “a new ‘Stakeholder View’ of the firm that stresses the role of
stakeholder relationships in the creation of organizational wealth”).
95
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 5 (Roosevelt
Inst., Working Paper No. 202008, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461924 (“To begin
changing corporate governance to require respect of all stakeholders, large companies
(whether publicly listed, or owned by a private equity firm or a rich family) receiving federal
bailout money should be required to become a benefit corporation under state law.”).
96
See generally SAMUEL F. MANSELL, CAPITALISM, CORPORATIONS AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT: A CRITIQUE OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY (2013) (critiquing stakeholder theory’s
normative foundations as being incompatible with the purpose of business in a market
economy); Yves Fassin, Imperfections and Shortcomings of the Stakeholder Model’s
Graphical Representation, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 879, 879 (2008) (confronting the stakeholder
theory’s shortcomings with a graphical scheme); Susan Key, Toward a New Theory of the
Firm: A Critique of the Stakeholder “Theory,” 37 MGMT. DECISION 317, 326 (1999)
(criticizing the stakeholder theory for lacking sufficient theoretical content).
93
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work, which examines the consumer interest in corporate law. 97 Yosifon uses
insights from law and behavioralism to examine the limits of the shareholder
primacy norm. 98 More recently, Ramsi Woodcock brought antitrust principles,
which require firms to maximize consumer welfare, to bear on corporate
governance.99 This Article shares the consumer orientation of these prior works but
offers a new perspective in that it relies on the rationales that have been used to
support shareholder primacy to justify the shift to consumer primacy for consumercentric businesses.
III. CONSUMERS’ RELATIONSHIP TO SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
Part III first examines the conventional view of the consumer in corporate law
discourse and the ways in which these views have kept consumers at the periphery
of corporate governance. I then examine how the confluence of technological and
cultural shifts has prompted a migration of consumers from the periphery to the core
of corporations and society. Last, I show how this shift has created a subset of firms,
referred to herein as “consumer-centric businesses,” in which consumers are the
primary stakeholders, drawing from the primary stakeholder characteristics
identified in Part II.
A. Traditional Consumers at the Periphery of the Shareholder Primacy Model
Under the traditional paradigm of shareholder primacy, consumers are seen as
one of the inputs to be managed in the managers’ pursuit of maximizing shareholder
value.100 This means that business decisions that reduce consumer welfare could be
seen as consistent with upholding corporate managerial duties, so long as there is a
net benefit to shareholders.
This treatment of consumers is consistent with stereotypes surrounding the
consumer, who is often seen as too multitudinous, myopic, uninformed, selfish, and
fickle to be given a seat at the corporate governance table. 101 Consumers, as
97

Yosifon, supra note 32.
Id. at 255–56.
99
Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Case for Consumer Primacy in Corporate
Governance, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1395 (2020).
100
See, e.g., Diane Denis, Corporate Governance and the Goal of the Firm: In Defense
of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 51 FIN. REV. 467, 471–72 (2016) (noting that firms
compete in markets for customers to find the set of factors of production most advantageous
to maximize shareholder wealth).
101
See LIZABETH COHEN, CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 9–11 (1st ed. 2003) (summarizing critiques of mass
consumption and consumerism); see also DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 220–51 (1976) (depicting consumerism as favoring personal gratification
over public household needs); Mark Bevir & Frank Trentmann, Introduction: Consumption
and Citizenship in the New Governance, in GOVERNANCE, CONSUMERS AND CITIZENS 14–
98
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suggested by the dictionary definition of the word consume (which includes the
meanings “to use up,” “spend wastefully,” and “burn away”), 102 are generally
understood as representing only their private material interests, and are thus seen as
unsuitable representatives of the collective interest. 103 Indeed, John Kenneth
Galbraith, in his book The Affluent Society, points to American private consumption
as the main culprit for the neglect of society’s needs.104
Another common perception of consumers is that they do not need any
additional corporate law protections as they can rely on external regulations (e.g.,
consumer protection and antitrust law), contracts, or the power of their purse (e.g.,
boycotts) to address any grievances that they may have suffered in their dealings
with a business.105
As Don Slater has observed, consumers are often depicted in terms of one of
two extremes.106 At one end of the spectrum, they are presented as “cultural dupe[s]
or dope[s]” susceptible to fraudulent promises and extraneous pressures.107 At the
other end, they are lauded as “hero[es] of modernity” encompassing the virtues of
rationality, robust autonomy, self-definition, and self-assertion.108 Acknowledging
the diversity of consumers’ capacities, it is in the cases where consumers fall on the
more enlightened side of Slater’s spectrum (accompanied by the recognition that a
growing number of consumers are moving in that direction)109 that they will likely
play a greater role in corporate governance.

16 (Mark Bevir & Frank Trentmann eds., 2007) (“Unfortunately a restricted concept of the
consumer has become ever more prominent since the late nineteenth century. The consumer
appears as an atomistic individual engaged in market exchanges so as to maximize the
satisfaction of his or her preferences.”).
102
Consume, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
consume [https://perma.cc/NZN8-GCH7] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
103
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
104
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 257 (1958) (“[I]n an
atmosphere of private opulence and public squalor, the private goods have full sway.”).
105
Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, Governance and Stakeholders, in THE
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 641 (Benjamin Hermalin &
Michael Weisbach eds., 1st ed. 2017) (referring to the ultimate consensus that nonshareholder corporate constituencies, including customers, should have their interests
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate
governance).
106
DON SLATER, CONSUMER CULTURE AND MODERNITY 33 (Polity Press ed. 1997).
107
Id.
108
Id.; THE CONSUMPTION READER 7 (David B. Clarke, Marcus A. Doel & Kate M.L.
Housiax eds., 1st ed. 2003) (noting that the model of the consumer as “gullible dupe” is just
as unrealistic as the neoclassical view of the consumer as “rational utility maximizer”).
109
See Lammi & Pantzar, supra note 31.
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B. Consumers as Primary Stakeholders of Contemporary Firms
In this subpart, I explain how many of the stereotypes and presumptions about
the consumer surveyed in subpart A do not comport with reality. A confluence of
technological and cultural developments has created a consumer that is more visible,
conscious, and proactive.110 There are a growing number of cases where consumers’
interests are in fact well aligned with the best interests of the firm. Some examples
include firms in the sharing economy, such as the ridesharing app Uber or the homesharing app Airbnb. In these businesses, individual consumers’ input regarding their
experiences is critical to building, establishing, and developing the market.111 Uber
drivers who treat their passengers well and Airbnb hosts who create a pleasant
environment for their guests are rewarded with more passengers and guests.112 This
reward cuts both ways, with conscientious riders and guests also being rewarded
with credit and priority status.113 In each of these cases, the consumers’ experiences
and contributions are measured and tracked in real-time and used as currency on the
110

See, e.g., Faisal Khoja, Adoption of Internet of Things (IoT): A Way of Increasing
Consumer Bargaining Power, 7 INT’L J. SCI. & ENG. RSCH. 790, 790 (2016) (“[I]nstant
access to information [through new technology] has allowed customers and consumers [to]
have a collectively rich bargaining power.”); Nicholas D. Evans, How Digital Business
Disrupts the Five Forces of Industry Competition, CIO (Aug. 26, 2015, 3:03 PM),
https://www.cio.com/article/2976572/digital-disruption-from-the-perspective-of-portersfive-forces-framework.html [https://perma.cc/K4P2-KA6R] (“Customers and consumers
have amassed far more bargaining power today due to instant access to information, insights
from social media including access to reviews and feedback, low switching costs via digital
channels, price sensitivity, access to substitute products and services with greater ease of use
and convenience, as well as increased industry competitiveness as a result of the other
forces.”); Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of
‘Corporate’ Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance, 20 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 430, 2018) (recognizing that new digital technologies offer modern
consumers platform operation, solutions to data problems, access and the ability to create
new information); Deirdre Shaw, Terry Newholm & Roger Dickinson, Consumption as
Voting: An Exploration of Consumer Empowerment, 40 EUR. J. MKTG. 1049, 1050 (2006)
(“[C]onsumers are often regarded as co-creators of the value that they derive from a product
or service.”).
111
Michelle de Haaff, What We Can All Learn from Uber’s Customer Experience,
MEDALLIA BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014) (using Uber as an example of innovation in consumer
experience).
112
How the Uber Rating System Works, UBER (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www.uber.com/en-EG/blog/how-the-uber-rating-system-works/ [https://perma.cc/N
AC7-SM6W] (“[R]ating a driver or rider does not affect your account, but having a high
rating means you are more likely to be prioritized by drivers if you are a rider, and more
likely to appeal to riders if you are a driver.”); Why Reviews Matter, AIRBNB RESOURCE
CENTER, (May 13, 2021), https://www.airbnb.com/resources/hosting-homes/a/why-reviewsmatter-41 [https://perma.cc/ZPX5-9WK7] (explaining that although a host’s rating of a guest
does not necessarily impact the guest’s use of or experience with the Airbnb platform itself,
it helps to inform potential hosts as to whether they want to host the guest or not).
113
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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platforms. 114 Accordingly, the algorithms behind these apps are designed to
privilege the consumer experience above all other factors, even price. 115 Uber’s
algorithm, for example, punishes drivers that previous passengers have had negative
experiences with by ensuring that such drivers do not show up in future searches.116
Additionally, there is a growing body of empirical studies suggesting that
consumer interest is well aligned with the long-term value of the firm.117 Indeed, as
support for this view, a work by Xiaotao Liu and coauthors demonstrates that
customer-oriented firms tend not to take shortcuts to boost stock prices in the
immediate term because of the potential negative long-term repercussions. 118
Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s 2011 Harvard Business Review article, How Great
Companies Think Differently, finds that companies that prioritize goals other than
maximizing shareholder value are the ones that are most successful at maximizing
shareholder value over time. 119 Kanter points to the unique contributions that
customers and other stakeholders can make, due to their long-term commitments to
the enterprise.120
Taking the alignment proposition a step further, there may be some cases where
consumers’ interests are aligned with the best interests of not just one particular firm
but the best interest of society overall. Compared to shareholder culture, which
represents one in two Americans in the United States (with reports that this

114

Reviews for Stays, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/reviews-forstays [https://perma.cc/7FU5-NX6A] (last visited Aug. 17, 2021) (requiring reviews of hosts
and guests to be submitted within 14 days of checking out); Bekah Wheeler, How Long Do
You Have to Rate Your Uber Driver?, RIDE GURU (Jan. 16, 2020), https://ride.guru/content/
newsroom/how-long-do-you-have-to-rate-your-uber-driver
[https://perma.cc/WL9LMWT2] (explaining that drivers must submit their reviews of passengers immediately or be
locked out of the app, while passengers must submit reviews of drivers within 24 hours).
115
See generally Jing Li, Simon Hudson & Kevin Kam Fung So, Exploring the
Customer Experience with Airbnb, 13 INT’L J. CULTURE, TOURISM & HOSP. RSCH. 410, 411,
420–23 (2019); Kevin Kam Fung So, Haemoon Oh & Somang Min, Motivations and
Constraints of Airbnb Consumers: Findings from a Mixed-Methods Approach, 67 TOURISM
MGMT. 224, 225–28 (2018) (noting that only customer enjoyment and experience was
significant in influencing consumers’ future behavioral intentions).
116
How Does Uber Match Drivers with Riders?, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/
marketplace/matching/ [https://perma.cc/873K-X4WQ] (last visited Aug. 13, 2021) (“Uber
may also modify pairings of drivers and riders in certain instances to help maintain a safe
platform; for example, we prevent matches if one has given the other a one-star rating in the
past.”).
117
For the argument that the stock market prices, on the other hand, are not accurate
measures of long-term value, see Bratton & Wachter, supra note 59, at 661, 700.
118
Xiaotao Liu, Xiaoxia Liu & Colin D. Reid, Stakeholder Orientations and Cost
Management, 36 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 486, 488–489 (2019).
119
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, How Great Companies Think Differently, HARV. BUS. REV.
MAG. (Nov. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/11/how-great-companies-think-differently
[https://perma.cc/NFA7-XH78].
120
Id.
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percentage of shareholders is declining), 121 consumption is a near-universal
experience. The consumer is a critical and growing stakeholder within firms, with
consumer spending in the United States reaching an all-time high of $13 trillion in
the fourth quarter of 2020. 122 Zygmunt Bauman describes consumption as “a
permanent and irremovable condition and aspect of life, bound by neither time nor
history; one of the inseparable elements of biological survival which we, humans,
share with all other living organisms.”123
Furthermore, in addition to their tremendous purchasing power, consumers
possess certain superior and distinct capacities. David Bowen and Gareth Jones have
argued that consumer participation is necessary to improve system efficiency within
the service industry.124 In particular, Bowen and Jones discuss how the diversity and
unpredictability of consumer demands are major sources of uncertainty. 125 They
argue that inviting consumer knowledge and labor during the production process is
an effective way to manage this uncertainty.126
There are a number of important examples of how the underrepresented
segments of our society have historically used their status as consumers as a source
of empowerment when other means of expression were unavailable. Lizabeth Cohen
describes how women and African Americans who were denied access to traditional
avenues of power after World War II seized upon the consumer role as a way for
them to uphold the public interest. 127 Monroe Friedman, an expert on consumer
boycotts, writes: “Since the Revolutionary War it can be argued that the boycott has
been used more than any other organizational technique to promote and protect the
rights of the powerless and disenfranchised segments of society.”128
Last but not least, as counterevidence to the “ultimate consensus” that
consumers are protected by contractual means, 129 it has been reported that
consumers often trade off contractual rights for more immediate perks.130 And while
121

Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All but Older, Higher-Income,
GALLUP (May 24, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/211052/stock-ownership-downamong-older-higher-income.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y8QF-4A6U] (finding that from 2001–
2008, an average of 62% of Americans owned stock, whereas from 2009–2017 an average
of 54% of Americans owned stock).
122
United States Consumer Spending, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/
united-states/consumer-spending [https://perma.cc/P48L-SS7D] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021)
(using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economics to analyze consumer spending trends).
123
ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, CONSUMING LIFE 25 (2007).
124
David E. Bowen & Gareth R. Jones, Transaction Cost Analysis of Service
Organization-Customer Exchange, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 428, 429 (1986).
125
Id. at 428.
126
Id. at 438–39.
127
COHEN, supra note 101, at 31–44 (discussing women as citizen consumers and the
black power of the purse).
128
MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE
MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 3 (1999).
129
Mehrotra & Morck, supra note 105.
130
See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
151, 151 (2014).
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it is true that there is a separate consumer protection regime, as Monroe Friedman
notes: “Since 1980 there has been a dramatic drop in government support for
consumer protection programs, and, in light of existing political and economic
realities, it seems unlikely that government support will increase markedly in the
near future.”131 Indeed, a March 2019 report of the Consumer Federation of America
documents a decline in enforcement activity at the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, which was created to ensure that financial companies treat customers
fairly.132
The impact that businesses have on consumers is also growing. As noted by
Andrew Crane and coauthors, corporations predetermine to a considerable degree
the extent of consumers’ citizenship, 133 social rights, 134 and civil rights. 135 The
mutual reliance between firms and their consumers may be more prevalent in
contemporary society, but it is not new. Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler
point to the separation between consumption and control in early nineteenth-century
business corporations as a fundamental feature of that era’s business corporations.136
In particular, they argue that the various corporate governance mechanisms observed
in firms with a high degree of separation of ownership and consumption were
developed primarily to protect consumers (who were also shareholders) from
monopolistic misconduct.137
As the mutual impact of corporations and consumers upon each other grows in
significance, the treatment of consumers as primary stakeholders of firms becomes
an important prerequisite to encouraging productive interactions between consumers
and businesses. The accounts of consumers as holders of superior or exclusive
information and ability—coupled with accounts of shareholder passivity, transience,

131

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 128, at 2.
CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-inDecline.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTM7-KWQ3].
133
Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, Stakeholders as Citizens? Rethinking
Rights, Participation, and Democracy, 53 J. BUS. ETHICS 107, 113 (2004). (“Corporations
predetermine a considerable scope for the exercise of consumers’ citizenship rights, such as
by denying them access to certain products, or enabling freedom of expression.”).
134
Id. (“In the area of social rights, corporations provide an increasing amount of
services, which in developed countries have long been linked to the welfare state.”).
135
Id. at 113–14 (“Corporations administer civil rights as they shape the freedom to
engage in markets by shaping the offer of goods and services as well as influencing consumer
preferences through advertising.”).
136
Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 53, at 951 (referring to “the lack of separation
between ownership and consumption” as “a critical but underappreciated feature of corporate
enterprise in the early Republic”).
137
Id. (“The peculiar features of early corporate law and practice were frequently
designed to minimize the abuse of that market power. They did not seek to protect the
corporation’s shareholders as investors, as is conventionally assumed today, but rather to
protect them as consumers.”).
132

260

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

impatience, and disinterest138—suggest that we need a new model of the firm in
cases where shareholder primacy no longer truly serves societal interests. In Section
III.C, I identify the characteristics of firms for which a consumer orientation, rather
than shareholder orientation, is more aligned with serving society’s interests.
C. Defining Consumer-Centric Business
The migration of consumers from the periphery to the core of contemporary
businesses has created a subset of firms in which consumers are primary
stakeholders. In these firms, consumers embody the primary stakeholder
characteristics identified in Part II which are also recounted below. This Article
refers to such firms as consumer-centric businesses.
1. Consumer Stakes
The first primary stakeholder characteristic is related to stakes: Which group of
stakeholders provides the most critical inputs to the corporation? As discussed in
Section II.A.1, the indispensable nature of the shareholders’ input in capitalintensive enterprises is often cited as the reason shareholders, over all other
stakeholders, receive special legal rights and protections.139 In a consumer-centric
business, however, consumers provide critical financial and nonfinancial inputs.
Take the example of crowdfunded firms. While the purchasers (or backers) of
a crowdfunded firm usually do not take equity, they provide critical inputs at the
early stages of the product’s development and recover their initial investment only
in the event of successful delivery. 140 This trend is expected to grow with new
crowdfunding limits that have raised the ceiling of consumer financial contributions
to $5 million per crowdfunded business.141 A well-known example of a crowdfunded
project is Oculus, a virtual reality headset developer that received much attention for
its impressive ability to draw from the crowd.142 Oculus suffered major setbacks,
however, when it failed to tend to its backers following its acquisition by

138

See supra notes 57 and 59–63 and accompanying text.
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 44.
140
Tim Smith, Crowdfunding, INVESTOPEDIA (May 15, 2021), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/c/crowdfunding.asp [https://perma.cc/EP3V-28A6] (explaining that
crowdfunding allows large groups to finance a new business venture through small
individual amounts of capital, but such investors face a high risk of losing their capital
because so many new businesses fail).
141
17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2020).
142
Michael A. Stanko & David H. Henard, How Crowdfunding Influences Innovation,
57 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 14, 15 (2016) (“[T]he Oculus Rift, a virtual-reality gaming
headset[,] . . . raised $2.4 million via crowdfunding.”).
139
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Facebook.143 This example demonstrates the significance of consumer inputs and
stakes as they relate to the ultimate success of the consumer-centric business.
2. Consumers’ Vulnerabilities
The second primary stakeholder characteristic is related to vulnerabilities:
Which group of stakeholders suffers the greatest risk of otherwise unmitigated harm?
The difficulty of protecting shareholder vulnerabilities by contract is one of the
central explanations for why shareholders, over all other stakeholders, receive
special legal rights and protections.144 In a consumer-centric business, however, the
consumer bears the risk, as was the case in the Boeing and Purdue Pharma examples
highlighted at the opening of this Article.
David Yosifon identifies three industries—tobacco, food, and dietary
supplements—in which consumers are the most vulnerable stakeholders.145 Yosifon
argues that these industries have adverse environmental, safety, and health impacts
that are borne disproportionately by the consumer, which requires prioritizing the
vindication of the consumer interest above all other interests.146

143

Id. (“Oculus VR was later acquired by Facebook Inc. for $2 billion.”); Laura Entis,
Game Over? Oculus Fans Outraged by Facebook Purchase, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2014,
2:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/game-over-oculus-fansoutraged-facebook-purchase-wbna54786612 [https://perma.cc/UNW8-H5P8]. Oculus faced
“instant and intense backlash from the gaming community, particularly from those who had
backed Oculus’s Kickstarter project,” upon Facebook’s acquisition of the company, with
many commentators claiming that Facebook’s intentions did not align with the perceived
intentions of Oculus as “the very antithesis of a tech behemoth like Facebook.” Id. See also
Luke Smith, The Oculus Rift Buyout Outrage: What Are the Rights of Kickstarter Backers?,
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2014
/04/the-oculus-rift-buyout-outrage-what-are-the-rights-of-kickstarter-backers/ [https://perm
a.cc/6HVQ-9NFF] (explaining that in response to Facebook’s announcement of its
acquisition of Oculus, “[m]any who had originally ‘invested’ in Oculus, some with money,
others with their vocal support, felt betrayed . . . [and] felt that they had rights when it came
to how the company operated, as they helped fund the launch of the project” (emphasis
added)).
144
See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 440–41 (referring to the
shared consensus that “ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder
class . . . [while] other corporate constituencies . . . should have their interests protected by
contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate
governance . . . and the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the
principal measure of the shareholders’ interests”); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 401
(explaining that corporate fiduciary duties are exclusively held by shareholders because they
become less valuable as they become more diffuse).
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Yosifon, supra note 32, at 255.
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Id. at 271–81.
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Continuing the example of crowdfunding from above, in these cases, money is
often collected upfront from consumers, with no guarantee of successful delivery.147
As another example, initial coin offerings (ICOs) have drawn significant
investments from consumers, notwithstanding the documented gap between
promises made in white papers versus promises delivered in the underlying smart
contracts (which are self-enforcing contracts embedded in computer code).148
Assuming no foul play, such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation, why would
consumers be willing to part with their money without demanding additional
protections in these situations? One reason is that trust or affinity (i.e., an emotional,
rather than economic, factor) is driving their contribution.
These consumer tendencies fit nicely within the rationales used by courts to
provide minority shareholders special protections under corporate law. Minority
shareholders are often seen as motivated by personal relationships and trust, which
prevents them from aggressively advocating for protections, thus creating a gap for
the law to fill.149 By the same token, consumers who rely on personal affinity for the
product, founder, or cause to determine whether to invest time, money, or ideas may
deserve similar treatment. Furthermore, in the case of crowdfunding, the fact that
monetary amounts tend to be small engenders collective-action problems, which
create an even greater gap for the law to fill.
3. Consumer Metrics
The third primary stakeholder characteristic is related to metrics: Which group
of stakeholders’ interests can be measured by a metric that can be readily determined
and uniformly compared? The ease and reliability of share price as a metric of
corporate value is one reason that shareholders, over all other stakeholders, receive
special privileges in corporate law. 150 In a consumer-centric business, however,
consumer satisfaction provides a reliable and accurate measure of a firm’s output,
and consumers’ interests are connected to the long-term value of the firm.
While consumer satisfaction may seem to be a subjective and psychological
concept that evades measurement, fortunately, some useful metrics of customer
satisfaction have been developed and used by researchers in exploring the
relationship between consumers and corporate governance.
147

Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS.
VENTURING 1, 11 (2014) (“[T]he money is raised up front, and, in the case of reward-based
crowdfunding, without any clear legal obligation from the project initiator to deliver their
promised rewards. For the dishonest, this creates an opportunity for fraud.”).
148
See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, CoinOperated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 643–44 (2019).
149
See supra Section II.A.2; see also Martin Edwards, The Big Crowd and the Small
Enterprise: Intracorporate Disputes in the Close-But-Crowdfunded Firm, 122 PENN ST. L.
REV. 411, 425 (2018).
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Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 440–41 (referring to the shared consensus
that “the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal measure of
the shareholders’ interests”).
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The American Consumer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) is one such measure.151 An
individual firm’s ACSI score represents its consumers’ overall evaluation of their
total purchase and consumption experience.152 The ASCI has three strengths: first,
it measures consumer satisfaction as experienced by consumers rather than by expert
ratings or managers’ perceptions; second, it provides a comprehensive picture of
consumer satisfaction for the major economic sectors; and third, it provides a
uniform set of comparable consumer-based firm performance measures.153
A number of empirical studies have used the ACSI to find a positive correlation
between customer satisfaction and a firm’s value.154 Recent work by Nick Bontis
and coauthors found that customer satisfaction is intertwined with organizational
reputation, particularly in the banking industry.155 Eugene Anderson and coauthors
have developed a theoretical framework that shows how customer satisfaction

151

AM. CUSTOMER SATISFACTION INDEX, About ACSI: Unique Benchmarking
Capability, https://www.theacsi.org/about-acsi/unique-customer-satisfaction-benchmarking
-capability [https://perma.cc/GHL5-9ZU7] (last visited Sept. 2, 2021) (“For over two
decades, the ACSI has used its science-based, proprietary methodology to analyze customer
satisfaction for 10 economic sectors and 47 key industries that together represent a broad
swath of the national economy.”); James Chen, American Customer Satisfaction Index
(ACSI), INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/americancustomer-satisfaction-index.asp [https://perma.cc/BD9A-YQLE] (“The American Customer
Satisfaction Index (ACSI) is an economic indicator of U.S. consumer sentiment that is based
on a nationwide survey in which U.S. consumers are asked to rate the products and services
that they use.”).
152
See generally Eugene W. Anderson, Claes Fornell & Sanal K. Mazvancheryl,
Consumer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value, 68 J. MKTG. 172, 174 (2004) (providing more
information about the ACSI).
153
Id.
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See Rajdeep Grewal, Murali Chandrashekaran & Alka V. Citrin, Customer
Satisfaction Heterogeneity and Shareholder Value, 47 J. MKTG. RSCH. 612, 617–18 (2010)
(using ACSI reports to measure customer satisfaction in relation to service quality and
advertising, suggesting impacts of customer satisfaction heterogeneity on shareholder value);
Don O’Sullivan & John McCallig, Does Customer Satisfaction Influence the Relationship
Between Earnings and Firm Value?, 20 MKTG. LETTERS 337, 337 (2009) (“Utilizing an
earning-based valuation model and data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index
(ACSI) and COMPUSTAT, the study shows that both satisfaction and the interaction
between earnings and satisfaction have a significant influence on firm value.”); Kapil R. Tuli
& Sundar G. Bharadwaj, Customer Satisfaction and Stock Returns Risk, 73 J. MKTG. 184,
194 (2009) (using the ACSI database to measure customer satisfaction scores and finding
that “customer satisfaction contributes to the creation of shareholder wealth by lowering the
overall and downside market and idiosyncratic risk”); see Xueming Luo, Jan Wieseke &
Christian Homburg, Incentivizing CEOs to Build Customer- and Employee-Firm Relations
for Higher Customer Satisfaction and Firm Value, 40 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 745, 750–52
(2012) (using ACSI to measure customer satisfaction in relation to CEO compensation).
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Nick Bontis, Lorne D. Booker & Alexander Serenko, The Mediating Effect of
Organizational Reputation on Customer Loyalty and Service Recommendation in the
Banking Industry, 45 MGMT. DECISION 1426, 1426–28, 1440 (2007).
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affects future customer behavior and, in turn, future cash flows.156 Their paper also
provides a comprehensive survey of the growing body of research linking customer
satisfaction to measures of financial performance.157
The empirical literature establishing a correlation between consumer
satisfaction and a firm’s value suggests that a model that looks to consumer
satisfaction as a measure of firm value is worthy of serious consideration as an
alternative for consumer-centric businesses.
***
In summary, consumers of consumer-centric businesses embody the
characteristics that have traditionally been used to justify the law’s treatment of
shareholders as primary stakeholders. Consumers of consumer-centric businesses
increasingly (as shareholders decreasingly) provide critical inputs and are the
victims of market failures for which corporate law provides the most effective shield.
Furthermore, consumer satisfaction is a useful measure of overall corporate value
for consumer-centric businesses. The thesis of the Article is that social welfare is
most efficiently served if corporate law serves the interests of the consumers, rather
than shareholders or other stakeholders, in these consumer-centric businesses.
IV. CONSUMER PRIMACY FOR CONSUMER-CENTRIC BUSINESSES
Part III identified how consumers of a growing number of contemporary firms
increasingly embody the characteristics associated with primary stakeholder status,
and labeled these firms as consumer-centric businesses. As established in Part I, the
failure to tend to consumer interests in consumer-centric businesses has led to some
of the most serious corporate disasters and scandals of recent years. Synthesizing
Parts II and III, this Part IV argues that corporate law should strive to serve the
consumer interest in consumer-centric businesses. This shift is expected to better
serve the interests of the collective enterprise and of society. Such a shift is achieved
by inviting consumers to participate in key corporate governance mechanisms by
giving them the right to representation, the protection of fiduciary duties, and the
right to receive tailored disclosures. This reorientation of corporate law and
governance mechanisms toward the consumer is referred to here as the consumer
primacy model of the firm.
I first describe the primary components of the consumer primacy model and
outline the options for implementation. I then discuss the expected benefits and
address potential objections and counterarguments.
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Anderson et al., supra note 152, at 178 (demonstrating a positive association
between customer satisfaction and long-term financial performance).
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Id.
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A. Consumer Primacy for Consumer-Centric Businesses
1. Certification as Consumer-Centric Business
The first step of the consumer primacy model is self-certification. Each
company that is subject to consumer primacy certification (the scope of subject firms
will be addressed at the end of this subsection) will be required to self-certify,
annually, as to whether it is a consumer-centric business.
Self-certification has been used in a number of other corporate contexts.
Recently, as businesses reopen in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, regulators
are encouraging businesses to self-certify as to their compliance with best and safe
operating practices.158 Benefit corporations that seek B Corp certification must first
complete an impact assessment, which is then reviewed by B Lab, a nonprofit that
administers the B Corp certification process.159
Self-certification reduces the likelihood of error, lowers transaction costs, and
gives companies control of their own governance, which will likely lead to more
buy-in and less resistance to compliance with subsequent steps.160 Businesses have
the best information about themselves, including where core inputs come from,
where the pain points are, and how they define and measure their successes and
failures. Another benefit of self-certification is that the process educates companies
about best practices and sensitizes them to issues that they are certifying on.161
While there may be some concerns that self-certification may lead to lower
compliance, these concerns can be addressed by requiring a responsible corporate
director or officer to make the certification and by creating incentives for compliance.
These incentives could take the form of financial, legal, or reputational benefits.
Self-certification is also a way for businesses to show consumers that they care about
the consumer impact of their business decisions. Convincing companies that careful
158

For example, Illinois announced the launch of “Back to Business,” a free, voluntary
service connecting small businesses of 250 or fewer employees with health and workplace
safety consultants, and offering self-certification to indicate to employees and consumers
alike the businesses’ practices. About Back to Business Illinois, ILLINOIS.GOV,
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/WorkSafe/AboutUs/Pages/About-Back-to-Business.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9LFS-7KXK] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
159
Certification,
BCORPORATION.COM,
https://Bcorporation.net/certification
[https://perma.cc/444F-QGDC] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
160
Evangelia Fragouli, The Interaction of Employee Trust & Ethical Decision Making,
11 BUS. & MGMT. REV. 161, 164 (2020) (explaining that self-certification allows business
leaders to build trust with their employees and influences leaders to make more ethical
decisions in order to keep their employees’ trust, while also improving access to information
between leaders and employees).
161
Dong-Young Kim & Young-Ha Hwang, Self-Certification Framework for
Technological Innovation: A Case Study, 31 INT’L J. QUALITY & RELIABILITY MGMT. 751,
758–59 (2014) (noting that appropriate control by top management in developing an internaldriven motivation and implementing “a voluntary certification program can provide
opportunities for stimulating mutual learning”).
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consideration of the consumer-centric nature of their business is beneficial in the
long term is critical to the success of this proposal.
Another way to reduce error and noncompliance in the certification process is
through simplicity and clarity—by not making it too difficult or expensive to certify
and comply. And while the certification is done at the individual company level, it
would be helpful to provide a common repository of resources and guidance,
including, in some cases, an intermediating entity162 such as the B Lab for benefit
corporations, as later discussed. The entity assigned to provide this guidance would
depend upon the method of implementation, which is discussed further in Section
IV.B.163
The certification process envisioned in this Article takes the form of an annual
survey, which includes a series of questions about the company’s relationship with
its consumers in terms of stakes, vulnerabilities, and metrics.
As to consumer stakes, the survey requires companies to ask: How important
are consumer inputs in achieving the corporation’s objectives? Inputs include both
tangible (money, land, material resources) and intangible (data, time, reputation)
resources. A company that certifies itself as a consumer-centric business will find
consumers to be its most critical input provider. A company that derives a majority
of its value from buying, selling, receiving, or sharing consumer information would
clearly satisfy this prong of the consumer-centric business definition.
As to consumer vulnerabilities, the survey requires companies to consider:
What are the risk factors of consumers, and how serious are they compared to the
risk factors impacting other stakeholders? For a company that is a consumer-centric
business, the harms suffered by consumers would be the most serious. These risks
include not only financial risks but also nonfinancial risks such as safety, privacy,
surveillance, and implicit bias.
As to consumer metrics, the survey requires companies to consider: How does
the firm track and measure its success? For a company that is a consumer-centric
business, the metrics used to evaluate the success of the entire enterprise will be
connected to consumers. Since there will likely be multiple metrics, respondents are
encouraged to consider scenarios where those metrics come into tension with one
another, to determine their relative priorities.
Companies whose consumers occupy the greatest space across all three
dimensions will be considered “consumer-centric” for purposes of the consumer
primacy proposal. Companies that do not fall under this designation may still wish
to adopt some of the suggestions made in this Article. At this first step, the goal is
for the most consumer-centric firms (i.e., those that derive the most value from and

162

Jonathan M. Barnett, The Certification Paradox, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW, VOL. 2: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, TRADE, PRIVACY,
TORT, COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK 252–53 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed. 2019) (explaining that
“a repeat-play intermediary supplies its reputational capital and evaluation expertise to
sellers who cannot make credible commitments to, or buyers who cannot make independent
evaluations of, product quality at a comparable cost”).
163
See infra Section IV.B.
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inflict the most harm on consumers) to identify as such and implement the suggested
changes to improve their consumer orientation.
Two examples that offer guidance for the consumer-centric business
certification process are the B Corp Impact Assessment (BIA) and the stakeholder
audit. The BIA is powered by the B Lab, a nonprofit organization that sends
companies a questionnaire tailored to the company’s size, sector, and geography and
includes questions about governance, workers, community, and environment.164 The
self-assessment is followed by a review and verification by the B Lab.
Approximately one in three of the companies that complete the assessment is
ultimately successful in being certified as a “Certified B Corporation.”165 Companies
are required to resubmit an assessment every three years, and the certification fees
range from $500 to $50,000 per year based on company revenues. While this
certification is not required to do business as a benefit corporation, the certification
provides companies with access to the reputation and community that attach to the
certification.166 Likewise, self-certification as a consumer-centric business could be
an effective signal to both consumers and peers of a company’s commitment to its
consumers and cooperative principles.
The second example, the stakeholder audit, is an entirely autonomous process
and does not involve any third-party review.167 The audit is voluntarily performed
by the company and can be adapted to the needs of the company.168 The purpose of
the stakeholder audit is to construct a social analog for the balance sheet and income
statement by requiring companies to explicitly state their corporate mission, identify
the stakeholder issues and concerns, assess corporate strategies for stakeholders, and
adjust priorities among stakeholder interests.169 From this analysis, the business can
construct a grid that ranks the importance of each class of stakeholder for achieving
success in each business target.
What these examples show is that self-assessment and self-certification take
many forms, with the common thread being that they require both internal and
external motivations. The proposed consumer primacy model can be understood as
one type of the stakeholder audit that could be further enhanced by an intermediating
entity, looking to the B Lab as a model.

164

About Us, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT, https://bimpactassessment.net/about-b-impact
[https://perma.cc/NPA9-KFE5] (last visited Aug. 15, 2021) (providing further information
through clickable links within the source).
165
Certification, supra note 159.
166
For differences, see Benefit Corporations & Certified B Corps, BCORPORATION.COM,
https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/benefit-corporations-and-certified-b-corps [https://perma.
cc/KHK7-775Y] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
167
See JOHN HARGREAVES & JAN DAUMAN, BUSINESS SURVIVAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
169–84 (1975).
168
Id.
169
Id.
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2. Consumer Representation
Once a business self-certifies as a consumer-centric business, it will be required
to appoint at least one consumer representative (or an equivalent) to serve on its
governing body. Alternatively, companies could elect to create a responsible board
committee or officer that is dedicated to the consumer interest (the relevant director,
officer, or committee is referred to here as the “consumer representative”). These
consumer representatives would be accountable to the consumers, meaning they
would represent the consumers’ interests and owe fiduciary duties to the
consumers.170
In addition, the consumer representative would need to be consulted when the
governing body meets to consider decisions and fundamental transactions that might
adversely impact consumer interests. While there may be concerns that attaching
greater responsibility to the consumer representative could lead to an unwillingness
to serve, 171 evidence of the impact of potential liability on board service is
inconclusive.172
The idea of a consumer interest director should be familiar to readers of Ralph
Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman’s 1976 book, Taming the Giant
Corporation.173 The authors’ vision contemplated each individual director having a
responsibility for a particular concern, including consumer protection. 174 Robert
Dahl is also credited for the idea of “interest group management,” which envisages
a board of directors that might consist of a mix of employee-elected representatives,
consumer-elected representatives, and delegates of federal, state, and local
governments. 175 Another variation, with which the proposal advanced here most
closely aligns, was proposed by Christopher Stone in 1975 (and reframed by Alfred
Conard in 1977), where he suggests that a “special interest” director be added for
any area in which the company demonstrates a delinquency.176
170

See infra Section IV.A.3.
See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 287, 301–02 (2008) (noting how the fear of potentially being held personally liable
for their corporate decision-making led to some directors resigning from their board positions
and others not even considering board service).
172
See Charles J. Hartmann & Pamela Gayle Rogers, The Influence of Smith v. Van
Gorkom on Director’s and Officer’s Liability, 58 J. RISK & INSURANCE 525, 529–31 (1991)
(noting that the “most disturbing predicted consequence” of the Van Gorkom decision—that
the fear of judicial scrutiny and liability would deter competent individuals from serving on
boards—seems to be overstated).
173
RALPH F. NADER, MARK J. GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 125 (1976).
174
Id.
175
Robert Dahl, Power to the Workers?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 20 (Nov. 19, 1970),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1970/11/19/power-to-the-workers/ [https://perma.cc/M4
RW-J6UG].
176
CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 152–83 (1975); Alfred F. Conard, Reflections on Public Interest
Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 941 (1977) (citing Stone).
171
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Successful examples of consumer participation in the formation of company
policies offer a helpful guide as to how consumer representation could work in
practice. In Europe, when the public had concerns about the safety of genetically
modified foods, supermarkets removed the products from their shelves not because
of government regulation, but because of their customers’ demands. 177 The
Cooperative Wholesale Society (CWS), a federation of consumer cooperatives,
solicited consumer opinion on the issue, which was then used to inform company
policy.178
Another example that could serve as a model for consumer primacy is the
mutual form of governance. For instance, Northwestern Mutual’s centerpiece of
governance is its Policyowners’ Examining Committee (POEC), which was formed
in 1909 with the specific goal of providing customers (policyowners) greater
representation and requiring the board to be accountable to these policyowners.179
Former president and CEO of Northwestern Mutual Edward Zore provides the
following account of the POEC’s scope of work:
Each year, the POEC makes an independent and completely unrestricted
evaluation of the company’s business operations, management, and
strategic plans. The process includes a personal review of the findings with
the CEO and, in separate meetings, with the board of trustees. Ultimately,
the committee’s report, in the members’ own words, is published in the
company’s annual report . . . . The POEC examination process involves
several rounds. Broadly speaking, members first receive extensive
information in advance of visits to the company’s Milwaukee headquarters.
Candidates make two visits, totaling about five business days. The first
visit covers broader topics. In the second visit, the POEC generally selects
a few areas to examine more intensively. The POEC is given free rein to
examine all company strategies, policies, and relevant documents. The
members encourage people to share how their jobs support the company’s
overall game plan. They confer with as many as 50 different people during
the process—policyowners, trustees, headquarters employees, and
members of the company’s field sales force.180
What is impressive about Northwestern Mutual’s participatory governance
model is its long history, as well as the various improvements that were made in the
company structure, operations, and strategy as a direct result of its consumers’
inputs.181 For example, Northwestern Mutual held its first annual planning rally in
1967, which included all top company executives, in response to a 1966 POEC
177

Crane et al.,, supra note 133, at 114.
Id. (citing CWS, RESPONSIBLE RETAILING (1995)).
179
Edward J. Zore, A Role for the Customer in Governance, 27 STAKEHOLDER
REPRESENTATION 35–37 (2003).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 36.
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request for long-range planning. 182 In addition, the company developed and
implemented an institutional “e-vision” to concretize the company’s leadership role
in technology within its industry in response to a 1999 POEC recommendation.183
While these efforts are most commonly observed in cooperatives or mutuals,
they are not limited to these business forms. Robert Stringer describes the efforts of
the EarthLink board to collect direct and unedited customer comments as to their
unmet and unsatisfied needs, as well as similar efforts made by Citigroup and
PepsiCo directors to directly engage with their customers.184
As more channels for communications with consumers are created and
implemented, the scope of consumer participation may also be expanded to include
voting on other matters relating to consumer interest. In the same way that even
“nonvoting” shares receive some basic voting rights when the matter being voted on
relates to their fundamental interests, consumers also have fundamental interests that
could be protected via voting rights.
Setting aside for a moment the challenges of implementation, which go beyond
the scope of this paper, what might that nonwaivable core of fundamental consumer
interests include in the context of consumer-centric businesses? And how can these
interests be protected using the mechanisms of corporate law and governance? A
good place to begin might be matters related to transparency and control over the
gathering and sharing of consumers’ personal data. The ownership of and control
over users’ personal data have become key concerns for consumers, corporations,
and regulators alike as the pervasive nature of corporations’ data collection and
marketing practices raises questions about consumers’ privacy and agency.185 These
matters would, under the current corporate law regime, be a matter within the
board’s business judgment. Legally mandating consumer approvals of matters
relating to consumer data may be one pathway, alongside legislation,186 to ensure
that companies abide by fair information-gathering practices.
3. Fiduciary Duties to Consumers
Much of corporate law has been focused on the question of how to manage
agency costs. In addition to voting, fiduciary duties have been developed as an
182

Id.
Id.
184
Robert A. Stringer, Hearing the Voice of the Customer in the Boardroom, 2006
CORP. BD. 18, 19–20 (2006).
185
See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (describing the
dangers of “surveillance capitalism” and the ways in which it threatens humanity).
186
Notably, California, Illinois, and a number of other states have implemented
legislation relating to the protection of consumer data collected by large corporations.
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100; Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008). In the European Union, the
General Data Protection Regulation is recognized as a leading piece of regulation in the
realm of consumer data protection. Regulation 2016/679, O.J. (L 119) 1.
183
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important agency cost mitigation mechanism. As consumers step into the role of
primary stakeholder, what would a corresponding transfer of fiduciary duty
protections to consumers look like?
This reorientation of the existing fiduciary duty model toward a new primary
stakeholder must begin by revisiting the principal-agent framework on which
shareholder primacy rests. To redirect fiduciary duties to consumers under the
prevailing framework (notwithstanding its limitations 187 ), one would need to
establish that the consumer is the principal to whom the consumer representative
owes its duties. This would be distinct from the agency relationship that the company
directors have with shareholders generally.
For the consumer primacy model to stand on these grounds, it must first be
established that consumers have manifested assent for the consumer representative
to act on the consumers’ behalf and subject to their control, and for the consumer
representative to also manifest its assent to so act.188 Some of these bonds will be
formed by contract, including informal and internal arrangements that emerge
around those contracts, and others by corporate law and regulations. By design, the
consumer representative introduced in the preceding Section IV.A.2. could be seen
as being subject to the control of consumers in the sense that they are selected to
serve for the benefit of the consumer interest.
It should be noted that this reorientation is consistent with the norms espoused
in the marketing field. 189 David Clarke and co-editors view the development of
consumer research within the field of marketing as “an attempt to overcome the
restrictive assumptions of the neoclassical account of the consumer”190 and note that
the impetus for the research was the call from business itself for a “more pragmatic
approach to understanding consumer behavior.”191 In this strain of the literature, the
consumer is viewed as the principal, with other corporate stakeholders (including
shareholders) existing to serve the consumer. Shareholder profits, in turn, are
187

It should be acknowledged that there are some problems with shareholder primacy’s
fit with the principal-agent framework (as highlighted by Lynn Stout in The Shareholder
Value Myth) which apply to the consumer primacy model as well. STOUT, supra note 36, at
93–95.
188
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
189
See Curt Fowler, The ROI of Customer Excellence – Part 2, BLOG POST: VALUES
DRIVEN
RESULTS,
https://valuesdrivenresults.com/roi-customer-excellence-part-2/
[https://perma.cc/MGJ3-N6P3] (last visited Aug. 28, 2021) (“A company’s primary
responsibility is to serve its customers, to provide the goods or services which the company
exists to produce. Profit is not the primary goal but rather an essential condition for the
company’s continued existence.” (quoting Peter Drucker)). For a full review, see Russell W.
Belk, Studies in the New Consumer Behavior, in ACKNOWLEDGING CONSUMPTION: A
REVIEW OF NEW STUDIES (Daniel Miller ed., 1995) (examining consumer behavior research).
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THE CONSUMPTION READER, supra note 108, at 5.
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Id. at 8. One notable exception is economist Adam Smith, who understood that:
“Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer
ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.”
ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 625
(Modern Library 1993) (1776).
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regarded as a necessary condition for the firm’s service of its consumers. Peter
Drucker is widely cited as teaching that “the purpose of business is to create a
customer.”192 John Mackey, cofounder of Whole Foods Market and the Conscious
Capitalism movement, has also embodied consumer primacy thinking in his
management philosophy by explaining (in a debate with the noted shareholder
primacist Milton Friedman):
Making high profits is the means to the end of fulfilling Whole Foods’
core business mission. We want to improve the health and well-being of
everyone on the planet through higher-quality foods and better nutrition,
and we can’t fulfill this mission unless we are highly profitable.193
Also relevant to this reconceptualization is the concept of trust, which is closely
aligned with the second prong of vulnerability in the primary stakeholder analysis.
The second prong looked at the ways in which consumers are the primary victims
of the market failures that corporate law protections have been specifically designed
to address. As in a close corporation, where minority shareholders are provided with
heightened protections (including heightened fiduciary duties and an appraisal
remedy) because of their susceptibility to misconduct by the majority shareholders,
the same logic could be used to extend fiduciary duties to consumers of consumercentric businesses.194
Returning to the earlier example of initial coin offerings (ICOs), there is an
alarming gap between promises made in the marketing stage and results actually
delivered to purchasers. 195 The issuers draw significant investments from
nonaccredited investors, they operate within an underregulated area of the market,
and the offerings are often built around a cult of personality. Thus, the conditions
are ripe for corporate law’s protectionist reach to extend to consumers in these cases.
192

Peter Drucker on Marketing, FORBES (July 3, 2006, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/2006/06/30/jack-trout-on-marketing-cx_jt_0703drucker.html?sh=
77962690555c [https://perma.cc/362M-6NAR]; see also Edwards, supra note 149 (arguing
that corporations should serve the customer).
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JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE HEROIC
SPIRIT OF BUSINESS xii (2013); David Shaywitz, Five Take-Aways from Whole Foods CEO
John Mackey’s Surprising New Book, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2013, 11:30 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidshaywitz/2013/02/16/five-take-aways-from-whole-food
s-ceo-john-mackeys-surprising-new-book/?sh=32a729e6576e
[https://perma.cc/EA5ED4T7].
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See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 595, 599–600 (Mass.
1975) (requiring a heightened fiduciary duty of directors and majority shareholders toward
minority shareholders of close corporations).
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See Cohney et al., supra note 148, at 597–613 (finding the mismatch between
promises made to investors and the actual corresponding ICO code for the top 50 ICOs of
2017 “troubling,” because investors relying on contractual promises, “even if legally binding,
might lack an easy and practical form of legal remedy” due to investors’ “very uncertain
ability to sue and recover founders’ assets”).
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Having established the theoretical bases for imposing fiduciary duties, we now
turn to their operation. The recent Cambridge Analytica scandal at Facebook
provides a relevant context for an illustrative example. In March 2018, over 50
million Facebook users learned that their personal data had been misused by the
analytics firm Cambridge Analytica.196 It was reported that Cambridge Analytica
had taken users’ private information to develop political propaganda campaigns.197
Facebook is currently facing multiple class-action suits, including suits filed by
shareholders claiming that the directors and officers of the firm breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to disclose the scandal in their previous SEC filings.198 If
Facebook had self-certified as a consumer-centric business, the users (and not only
the shareholders) of Facebook would also be able to seek damages and equitable
relief for breaches of the fiduciary duties caused by the company’s breach of users’
trust. In this way, consumer primacy allows those most directly harmed by the
corporate activity—the users—to seek to recover damages they suffered as a result
of the breach of their trust.
This proposal to shift the benefit of fiduciary protections to consumers is
consistent with existing modifications to the scope and beneficiaries of fiduciary
duties. Notably, in banking, directors are subject to enhanced duties toward bank
depositors (in addition to bank shareholders) on the grounds that banks are charged
with serving the public interest.199
Furthermore, the idea of broadening the groups to whom managers are held
accountable has been embraced by both business and policy leaders.200 The most
recent edition of the Business Roundtable’s “Principles of Corporate Governance”
invites boards to consider all of the company’s constituencies—which include
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community in which the company does
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business—when making decisions. 201 The principles explicitly state that
corporations “have obligations to stakeholders other than their shareholders” and
that the interests of these stakeholders are to be considered in the context of
achieving long-term value. 202 This is noticeably different from the earlier 2012
edition of the same principles, which stated that “obligations [to other constituents]
are best viewed as part of the paramount duty to optimize long-term shareholder
value.” 203 Extending corporate fiduciary duties to consumers can be used to
operationalize these growing calls for change.
The proposal here is related to, but to be distinguished from, Jack Balkin’s
information fiduciaries. 204 Information fiduciaries refer to the idea that digital
companies should be treated as fiduciaries because people are deeply dependent on
and vulnerable to them. Balkin argues that law should impose on these companies
special duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty that run to their end users. 205
Elements of Balkin’s proposal are found in a new bill that requires online service
providers to act as fiduciaries for their users.206
While the consumer primacy proposal and Balkin’s proposal both seek to use
fiduciary duties to widen the scope of protections to consumers, the latter applies
only to data companies and is justified primarily on moral grounds, citing a special
relationship of trust and confidence. By contrast, consumer primacy applies to all
companies and is supported by agency as well as fiduciary principles. In another
respect, Balkin’s proposal goes further by considering the entire entity (rather than
a dedicated representative, as the consumer primacy proposal does) as owing a
fiduciary duty to its users.207
In spite of their differences, there are also notable synergies between the two
concepts. Consumer primacy provides a way to reconcile the information fiduciary
201
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2016),
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Roundtable’s Reversal on Corporate Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285, 286 (2021) (explaining
that the law of corporate purpose remains oriented toward the maximization of shareholder
value); Melissa C. Bender, Isabel K.R. Dische, Keith F. Higgins, Joshua A. Lichtenstein &
Michael R. Littenberg, Business Roundtable Broadens Scope of a Corporation’s Purpose to
Include Other Stakeholders, ROPES & GRAY (Aug. 26, 2019) (noting that the Statement did
not alter or change a director’s fiduciary duties).
202
BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 201, at 25.
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concept with corporate law by providing the theoretical and normative bases to
loosen the firm grasp that shareholder primacy has on corporate law. Those who
have taken a skeptical view of Balkin’s information fiduciaries proposal point to the
concept’s incoherence with corporate law, which makes clear that shareholders
come first. 208 Consumer primacy provides a safe harbor for managers to give
preference to consumer interests under specified conditions (i.e., the conditions that
make a business a “consumer-centric business”). These debates show how any
“grand bargain” for regulating digital companies must be coordinated with corporate
law and governance.
4. Disclosures
The consumer primacy model requires consumer-centric businesses to report
their performance on consumer metrics. This suggested intervention is related to the
third prong of the consumer-centric business definition. It stems from the
recognition that consumer metrics may be just as reliable and accurate, if not more
so, than the traditional measure of firm value, a firm’s share price.209
For many firms, the previously discussed American Consumer Satisfaction
Index (ACSI) could provide a reliable measure of consumer satisfaction.210 Other
industry-specific measures of customer satisfaction, such as measures of patient
well-being in the health care industry, could also be considered. The choice and
review of metrics and methods of disclosure will fall under the responsibility of the
consumer representative. The noncontroversial cases are the ones where consumer
interest and shareholder value are aligned. Take, for example, the airline industry.
Passenger safety and satisfaction are two of the most important measures of an
airline’s performance and have been shown to be useful precursory indicators of a
firm’s market value. A 2007 study found that the number of customer complaints to
the Department of Transportation (DOT) had an impact on the stock market
performance of that airline.211 The study estimated that Southwest Airlines could be
expected to suffer a loss of $262 million in its market value for each 1% increase in
DOT complaints. 212 Assuming Southwest satisfies the two other prongs of the
consumer-centric business definition, and self-certifies as a consumer-centric
208
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133
HARV. L. REV. 497, 504 (2019) (“A fiduciary with sharply opposed loyalties teeters on the
edge of contradiction.”).
209
See supra Section III.C.3.
210
The ACSI is a national cross-industry measure of customer satisfaction that
measures the satisfaction of U.S. household consumers with the quality of products and
services offered by firms with significant share in U.S. markets. See generally AMERICAN
CONSUMER SATISFACTION INDEX, https://www.theacsi.org/ [https://perma.cc/AP6A-KKV5]
(last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
211
Xueming Luo, Consumer Negative Voice and Firm-Idiosyncratic Stock Returns, 71
J. MKTG. 75, 82 (2007) (finding that when dissatisfied customers complain against an airline
to Department of Transportation, the stock price of that airline declines dramatically).
212
Id.
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business, DOT complaints would be one of the measures that the airline would be
expected to disclose to its stakeholders.
The more difficult cases are the ones where consumer and shareholder value
are in tension with one another. These are the cases, however, where consumer
primacy matters most. These are the contexts where the temptation to prioritize
shareholder profits over consumer satisfaction are strongest as we saw from the
Boeing and Purdue Pharma examples that opened this Article. In managing these
temptations, consumer-centric businesses—through the consumer representative—
will be required to consider the trade-offs they have made between consumer and
shareholder interest.
B. Implementation
In the United States, internal corporate affairs are governed by state corporate
law, contracts, federal securities laws and stock exchange rules. In this subpart of
the paper, I discuss the available methods for implementing consumer primacy,
describing the strengths and weaknesses of, and the potential synergies and conflicts
among, each.
1. Private Ordering
The pathway to consumer primacy that requires the least external intervention
would be for companies to adopt it voluntarily.213 In fact, a number of innovative
companies have already done so, such as LunaDNA, a San Diego-based company
that collects personal genetic information from users and provides that information
to medical researchers.214 LunaDNA is the first community-owned health and DNA
data platform to offer membership shares to members for contributing personal
health information.215 This approach stands in stark contrast to the dominant model
in this industry, which takes both money and data from users, usually in exchange
for a health report or other diagnostic.216

213
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 319, 321 (2002) (private
ordering delegates regulatory authority to private actors, in the commercial context, to reduce
the cost of regulation).
214
LUNA PBC, https://www.lunadna.com/lunapbc/ [https://perma.cc/GGC5-GA5R]
(last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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LunaDNA Is Approved by the SEC to Offer Ownership Shares to Individuals for
Sharing Data, LUNADNA (APR. 19, 2019), https://www.lunadna.com/ownership-shares-forsharing-data-2/ [https://perma.cc/9333-JZY9].
216
For example, 23andMe and AncestryDNA are two companies that require users to
submit a payment in addition to their genetic information in exchange for an analysis of their
genetic input. How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/?gnav=gv1
[https://perma.cc/J9NE-LC2J] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021); How Does AncestryDNA Work?,
ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/lp/how-does-ancestrydna-work [https://perma.
cc/T5PV-PNT3] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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One complication of private ordering is the obvious conflict with shareholder
primacy. Pursuing consumer interests at the expense of shareholder value was
considered to be a breach of fiduciary duties in a notable Delaware case, eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark. 217 In that case, Craigslist’s majority
shareholders were found to be in breach of their fiduciary duty when they executed
plans to cut ties with eBay (Craigslist’s then minority shareholder) so that they could
continue their user-friendly business model without pressure from eBay to
aggressively pursue monetization. 218 The Delaware Court of Chancery held:
“Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [policy] to defend a
business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at least
not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”219
Clear judicial or legislative guidance that a consumer primacy approach is
legally permissible (even for an investor-owned enterprise) if the business meets the
definition of consumer-centric business, will thus be an important prerequisite to the
successful implementation of the consumer primacy proposal.
Just as important as these external permissions, if not more, are internal
motivations. In order for the consumer primacy model to succeed, consumer-centric
businesses and their directors and executives must be dedicated to prioritizing
consumer interests above all other interests, including profit maximization in the
short term. One force that might help to propel institutions toward consumer primacy
is the global consensus building around more sustainable and accountable corporate
governance structures. 220 The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) have been a beacon guiding this movement.221 Among the seventeen goals,
goal twelve focuses on strategies to ensure sustainable consumption and production
patterns.222 The goal states: “Sustainable consumption and production is about doing
more and better with less.”223 As noted in this Article’s Introduction and throughout,
consumer primacy is not about just more consumption, but more sustainable
consumption that is aligned with the long-term interests of the business and society.
217

16 A.3d 1, 48 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Id. at 8–9.
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Id. at 35.
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221
See United Nations Sustainable Development Programme, SUSTAINABLE DEV.
GOALS (last visited Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable
-development-goals.html#:~:text=The%20Sustainable%20Development%20Goals%20(SD
Gs,peace%20and%20prosperity%20by%202030
[https://perma.cc/K9DW-NS2H]
(outlining 17 distinct goals to strive towards as adopted by U.N. Member States).
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SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainableconsumption-production/ [https://perma.cc/X58U-9GEK] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
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Id.; see Sustainable Consumption and Production Policies, U.N. ENV’T
PROGRAMME, https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/sustain
able-consumption-and-production-policies [https://perma.cc/H6WL-JLW4] (last visited
Sept. 10, 2021).
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It is aligned with the SDGs, which define sustainable consumption and production
(SCP) as:
[T]he use of services and related products, which respond to basic needs
and bring a better quality of life while minimizing the use of natural
resources and toxic materials as well as the emissions of waste and
pollutants over the life cycle of the service or product so as not to
jeopardize the needs of future generations.224
One way consumer primacy points toward SCP is by giving consumers a sense of
empowerment as well as responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
Other paradigms that are aligned with consumer primacy include the platform
cooperativism movement. The platform cooperativism movement, led by Trebor
Scholz, suggests the cooperative form as the democratic ideal for the sharing
economy. 225 Platform cooperativism rests on three pillars: change of ownership,
solidarity, and intertwining of economic and social goals.226 The movement draws
on consumers’ willingness to share while addressing the risks of “crowd fleecing”
(a term used to describe institutions’ financialization of personal assets),227 which is
an important aim of consumer primacy as well.
2. Federal Legislation
Consumer primacy could also be introduced through federal legislation. One
model is the Accountable Capitalism Act, a bill introduced by Senator Elizabeth
Warren in August 2018, which requires directors of large public companies to have
a duty to consider the interests of shareholders, employees, customers, the
community, the environment, and the long term.228
While the proposed Accountable Capitalism Act is framed as a stakeholder
governance model, it is primarily focused on empowering employees. Notably,
subsection 6(b)(1) of the proposed act requires that “[n]ot less than 2/5 of the
directors of a United States corporation [defined as corporations with over $1 billion
in tax receipts229] shall be elected by the covered employees . . . .”230 Furthermore,
the proposed act applies only to large corporations (as measured by tax receipts).231
Despite some obvious differences in scope, the Accountable Capitalism Act
offers a helpful model and potential synergies for the consumer primacy model
224
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proposed here. The Accountable Capitalism Act envisions a dedicated unit (a newly
established “Office of the United States Corporations”) to monitor compliance and
refer violations to the appropriate federal agency for enforcement.232 The Office of
the United States Corporations would also have the ability to rescind and revoke
corporate charters if appropriate.233 This office would also be well suited to the task
of monitoring compliance with the proposed consumer primacy reforms.
Elsewhere in the world, former British prime minister Theresa May has
proposed mandating employee and customer participation in corporate
governance. 234 Germany’s codetermination model also offers a guide for nonshareholder stakeholder (in that case, employee) representation on corporate
boards.235
Federal securities regulation reforms would also be useful in implementing
consumer primacy reforms, especially for public corporations. Ann Lipton argues
for the disclosure of more information—in a similar vein to the consumer metric
disclosures required of consumer-centric business—to protect not only investors but
other stakeholders.236 David Yosifon contemplates the various ways in which federal
securities laws could be reformed to tend to consumer interest, including by allowing
consumers to vote on shareholder proposals on social issues or by permitting
consumers to author proposals and submit them to shareholders or to the entire
firm.237 While these suggestions are beyond the scope of the proposal advanced here,
they are very well aligned with the consumer primacy model and its goal of
strengthening the consumer’s voice in consumer-centric businesses.
The key difficulty of the federal approach lies in the political challenges of
implementation. Even with all the praise the Accountable Capitalism Act has

232
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See id. § 3(c)(4)(B).
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received,238 it has engendered no meaningful progress to date.239 Federal regulation
of corporations has typically been wrested out of large-scale crises. It was only after
the Enron Corporation, Tyco International, and WorldCom accounting scandals that
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 to protect investors from
fraudulent financial reporting by corporations.240 And it was only after the 2007–
2008 global financial crisis that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, including consumer protection reforms such as the creation of a new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, was enacted.241 Similarly, now may be a ripe
moment for reform as the COVID-19 pandemic reveals the inadequacies of the
current system.242 The pandemic magnified the long-standing structural inequalities
in our society, yet also highlighted the ingenuity and capabilities of companies to

238

See, e.g., Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards ‘Accountable Capitalism’:
Remaking Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, ROOSEVELT INST. 1, 5 (2018)
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develop a vaccine in record time. 243 This crisis, as devastating as it was and
continues to be, has given the public and policymakers an opportunity to reimagine
and implement a better future for all, toward which consumer primacy, I argue, takes
us one step closer.
3. State Statutes
U.S. corporate law largely comprises state laws, and thus, amending state
corporate codes to mandate consumer primacy could offer a clear pathway thereto.
Among the fifty states, California is a promising potential first mover. Notably,
California has been one of the leaders in consumer privacy legislation,244 as well as
board diversity mandates. 245 California is known to have some of the strongest
consumer protection laws in the United States, with an active network of consumer
groups, including the Utility Consumers’ Action Network, Consumer Federation of
California, and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.246
As I’ve discussed in another article, a few large states (notably, California and
New York) have a corporate long-arm provision in their corporate statutes that gives
them the power to influence the internal affairs of domestic and foreign corporations
if those corporations have a material impact on residents within the state. 247
“Material impact” in this context would be determined by reference to the number
or percentage of resident consumers that the organization deals with annually, with
any organization that exceeds a predetermined threshold being subject to the
consumer primacy provisions.
The downside of a state-led approach is that its protection can only reach the
individual state’s residents. In addition, the buy-in of multiple states would be
required before large-scale change could occur. But as we saw with the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA), a
single state can create a contagion affect. California provided a blueprint for other
states to thereafter introduce “copycat” legislation, with Virginia following suit by
243
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signing the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act into law soon thereafter248 and
many others expected to follow.249
In addition to state corporate law, state organizational law could provide yet
another avenue for reform. While consumer cooperatives offer a useful guide for
cooperative principles, their reach is limited to those who opt into these business
forms. The reality is that many consumer-centric businesses are not organized as
cooperatives. 250 Some reasons include managerial capture, collective-action
problems among consumers, and a preference among legal and financial advisers for
the Delaware corporate form.
The good news is that the popularity of the cooperative form has continued to
grow. According to a 2014 report for the United Nations, there were 2.6 million
cooperatives with over 1 billion members worldwide.251 Although cooperatives are
gaining popularity, according to research conducted by Greg Brodsky, only about
10% of people can actually define the term.252 The consumer primacy proposal is a
way to insert clearly defined consumer protection mechanisms inspired by
cooperative principles into investor-owned and other enterprises.
Another natural area of overlap between the consumer primacy proposal and
organizational law is the benefit corporation statutes. As with cooperatives, however,
the benefit corporation model’s reach is again limited to those who opt into that
248
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business form. It is only a partial solution, as the companies which are prone to trade
off consumer welfare for greater shareholder profits will likely not be organized as
public benefit corporations. So long as the thumb on the corporate law scale weighs
down on the Delaware investor-owned enterprise, internal and external interventions
will be necessary to rebalance the scale and realize the proposals set forth in this
Article.
4. Implementation Priorities
Among the options discussed, federal legislation with few carve-outs would be
the most effective in terms of its uniformity and breadth. A second-best option would
be state regulation, coupled with the contagion effect that could be triggered by a
strong first mover. The most organic option would be private ordering, but this
would require both internal and external coordination.
Each of the implementation strategies should be explored together to realize
consumer primacy for consumer-centric business. The hope is that the combination
of international, federal, and state regulation will bring greater awareness of
consumer primacy as a superior form of doing business for consumer-centric
businesses. This awareness could then culminate in the creation of a new business
form, perhaps a variant of the benefit corporation, that caters to consumer interest,
which could come to be known as a “Consumer Benefit Corporation.”
For any of these solutions to work (or be birthed in the first place), there needs
to be a shift in consciousness among consumers themselves. A 2020 study by IBM
noted a shift among consumers from value-driven (those who are primarily
concerned with price and convenience) to purpose-driven (those who select brands
based on alignment with their personal values).253 Over 70% of the respondents they
surveyed said they looked for specific value attributes when making a purchase and
choosing a brand.254 The current generation of consumers have the will and aptitude
to demand changes in the businesses they engage with;255 consumer primacy gives
them one platform to do so.
One recent example of consumers using the power of their purse to achieve
social objectives can be found in the legal profession.256 The legal profession is one
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of the least diverse professions.257 While shareholders (i.e., equity partners) have not
been reliable agents of change, their clients have been making a concerted effort to
increase diversity by demanding it from the firms they engage. 258 Some of the
initiatives include requirements that one-third of a law firm’s team be composed of
women and ethnic minorities or that law firms create and implement clear and
measurable leadership opportunities for women and minorities.259
A notable example is Hewlett Packard, which has a policy for withholding a
percentage of all amounts invoiced by law firms that do not meet or exceed their
minimal diverse staffing requirements.260 Similarly, but employing a carrot rather
than a stick, Microsoft has a detailed diversity checklist and pays a 2% bonus (based
on the previous year’s fees) to firms that satisfy or exceed such criteria.261 Facebook
has a policy regarding the selection of law firm representation that requires at least
33% of the lawyers retained by the firm to be female or a member of an ethnic
minority group.262
257
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C. Expected Benefits
Shifting to a consumer primacy model for consumer-centric businesses is
expected to lead to a more efficient and just outcome for these businesses. The
consumer primacy model incentivizes consumers to engage in the enterprise by
offering them more control and participation rights, as well as protections for the
risks that they bear. It is the alignment of the consumers’ interests with societal value
that ensures that consumer satisfaction is a reliable metric against which managerial
performance can be measured. The consumer primacy model also inspires
consumers to become more conscious and responsible participants in business and
society.
1. Empowering Consumers
Consumer primacy seeks to provide consumers of consumer-centric business
with legal rights and protections that are more commensurate with their economic
contributions. This aspect of consumer primacy is most closely related to the first
prong of the primary stakeholder characteristic. As established in Section III.C.1.,
in consumer-centric firms, consumers (more so than any other stakeholder, including
shareholders) are the stakeholders that provide the input that is most valued by the
firm, and that have the greatest stake in the firm’s success or failure.
Granting consumers more rights gives them stronger incentives to further invest
in the inputs that generate core value for consumer-centric businesses. These rights
are designed to incentivize their investments (e.g., time, information) in much the
same way shareholder primacy sought to incentivize capital investments during a
time when capital was scarce and vital to industry. The shift to consumer primacy is
expected to better serve the goals of corporate and organization law, which, as
established in Part II, are to identify the primary stakeholder whose interests are
most aligned with collective social interest and to give them ownership and control
rights that maximize not only their own but also society’s well-being.
2. Protecting Consumers
In addition to empowering consumers, consumer primacy also seeks to protect
consumers using fiduciary duties, as discussed in Section IV.A.3. This aspect of
consumer primacy is most closely related to the second prong of the primary
stakeholder analysis, which is related to a stakeholder’s vulnerability to harm. As
established in Section III.C.2., in consumer-centric businesses, consumers are the
stakeholders (more so than any other stakeholder, including shareholders) that bear
undiversified and unprotected risks due to the nature of their relationship to the firm.
Many of the explanations commonly used to justify shareholders’ status as
news/2017/04/13/diversity-and-inclusion-not-just-anideal-but-a-client-demand/ [https://per
ma.cc/XLD5-DDSU] (“Increasingly, clients are creating both incentives and penalties for
their vendors and suppliers to align with their diversity goals.”).
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beneficiaries of corporate law protections are apt explanations of the consumers’
status in consumer-centric businesses, yet the applicable legal framework presumes
and treats shareholders as the sole and exclusive beneficiaries of these protections.
Consumer primacy seeks to address this misalignment by transferring certain
corporate law protections from shareholders to consumers in consumer-centric
businesses.
3. Aligning Corporate and Societal Value
Consumer primacy, like shareholder primacy, draws from the principal-agent
model of the firm, which is mired in agency costs. One way to mitigate agency costs
is by clear identification of the primary stakeholder whose interests are to be served
by the enterprise. In a consumer-centric business, as established in Section III.C.3.,
consumer satisfaction or other consumer metrics provide high-quality, reliable
information about firm value. Requiring consumer-centric businesses to report on
consumer metrics (as discussed in greater detail in Section IV.A.4.) is expected to
reduce agency costs in consumer-centric firms by offering an observable and
dependable metric to assess managerial behavior and firm performance.
The proposed interventions seek to shift the corporation’s perception of the
consumer from object to subject—not as one from whom to extract shareholder
value but as one who provides input, insight, and guidance. Giving consumers a seat
at the table will change consumers’ own perceptions of their role within society and
their part in its sustenance.
4. Diversity and Inclusion
Increased consumer participation in corporate governance is also expected to
inject diversity into the boardroom, the lack of which has been at the center of recent
debates about U.S. corporate culture.263 For example, electrical networks, frequently
organized as consumer cooperatives, were one of the first groups to elect women to
their boards. 264 A December 2015 report by the International Cooperative and
Mutual Insurance Federation (ICMIF), which is recognized as a global
representative leader for cooperative and mutual insurance organizations, shows that
women held 21% of board seats on cooperatives, and almost half (48%) of
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cooperatives had three or more women on their boards in that year.265 In contrast,
among the S&P 1500 in 2016, women held only 17.8% of corporate board seats and
19% in 2017. 266 The data indicate that consumer participation in corporate
governance opens up a wider and more diverse pool of candidates from which
consumer-centric business can recruit directors, and thus consumer primacy could
create a direct pathway to more diverse boards.
D. Potential Objections
This subpart addresses some of the potential objections to the consumer
primacy proposal. Many of these objections, as I describe in more detail below, are
universal challenges that are not unique to consumer primacy, and in many ways,
consumer primacy fares better than other alternatives in addressing these challenges.
1. Managerial Misconduct
There is a general concern that straying from shareholder value will lead to
managerial misconduct. In Elaine Sternberg’s critique of the stakeholder theory, her
main issue with the stakeholder model is that the theory is incompatible with
business because it leads to a diffusion of managerial focus.267 Sternberg cautions
that this diffusion will ultimately undermine ownership, representation, and
wealth. 268 In Sternberg’s view, the large number of relevant stakeholders makes
catering to all of them chaotic and ineffective, and the difficulty of comparative
analysis makes the board accountable to no one.269 Furthermore, when the number
of stakeholders is unmanageable, leadership ignores groups that have no bargaining
power or influence, which worsens the inequality issues that the stakeholder model
seeks to address.270
The comparative strength of the consumer primacy model over the stakeholder
model is that there is a primary stakeholder—the consumer—to whom the consumer
265

ICMIF Members’ Governance 2016, INTERNATIONAL COOP. MUT. INS. FED’N (Sept.
2016), https://www.icmif.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ICMIF-Members-Governance2016-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VKH-XUZZ].
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representative will be held accountable, thereby avoiding the diffusion problem.
Furthermore, the definition of consumer-centric business rests on the availability of
a specific metric by which consumer interest can be measured, which is the third
prong of the definition of a consumer-centric business. This overcomes the concerns
raised by Sternberg and others that straying from shareholder primacy will lead to
unfettered board discretion.271
Yet, one of the challenges of relying on consumer satisfaction as a metric of
firm performance is that satisfaction may seem to be an inherently subjective matter.
As discussed in Jerry Muller’s book The Tyranny of Metrics,272 an excessive fixation
on metrics without understanding why the metrics are being used threatens the
quality of organizations and the people they serve.273 Furthermore, reviews or star
ratings on consumer products may be bought, forged, or otherwise influenced.
Fortunately, there are a number of metrics available to measure consumer
satisfaction, welfare, and utility that are gathered by independent parties and are
tailored to the subject enterprise. 274 An independent index, such as the
aforementioned ACSI, which is designed, conducted, and analyzed by the National
Quality Research Center (NQRC) at the University of Michigan, overcomes these
challenges.275
2. Administrability
There will likely be a host of concerns surrounding the administrability of the
consumer primacy proposal. For one, heterogeneity within the consumer group
poses a challenge to identifying the representative consumer whose interest the
consumer representative is charged with serving. In considering the possibility of
customers’ membership on the board of directors, Oliver Williamson flags the
practical challenges of implementation by asking: Who are the representative
consumers, and how do they communicate with their constituency?276 As noted by
Grant Hayden and Matthew T. Bodie, it is difficult to devise an accurate way to
identify specific members of the consumer constituency.277
271

See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 51; Roe, supra note 269.
JERRY Z. MULLER, THE TYRANNY OF METRICS (2018).
273
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Identification becomes especially challenging in two-sided markets. Using the
example of a social media platform, consumers include both the ad buyers and the
social media account holders whom these ad buyers are targeting. In such cases, the
representative consumer would first need to be identified based on the stakesvulnerability-metric analysis outlined in Section III.C, an identification which would
need to occur at the first step of the self-certification process.
As complicated as they appear, these challenges are not unique to consumers.
There is a growing recognition that shareholders too are not a homogenous group.278
Elaine Sternberg acknowledges that shareholders are imperfect beneficiaries
themselves but defends them nonetheless as the best among the available options.279
What Sternberg finds to be key to creating accountability are mutually beneficial
long-term relationships.280 What I show here is that as shareholders have become
increasingly passive, impatient, indifferent, and/or self-interested, consumers are
increasingly assuming the mantle of leadership and are moving toward the core of
mutually beneficial relationships that generate long-term value within consumercentric businesses.
3. Capacity
There is also the issue of whether consumers are capable of performing the
tasks that the consumer primacy model assigns to them. The consumer primacy
proposal contemplates consumers participating indirectly via a representative in
some, but not necessarily all, matters of corporate governance and only in some, but
not all, firms. In this regard, excluding consumers from corporate governance on the
basis that they lack capacity is overbroad, especially considering that even a small
percentage of savvy consumers can harness the power to influence businesses.281
Another concern, related to capacity, is that consumers may not have sufficient
information or access to independent advice and counsel. Consumers have been
described as quasi-rational, meaning their rational choices are constrained by
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uncertainty. 282 Again, the suggestion made here is that consumer interests be
reflected in some, but not all, matters of corporate governance, and in particular only
in the matters in which a consumer representative has information and experience,
some of which can be cultivated by the firm itself, as demonstrated by the example
of Northwestern Mutual.283
4. Redundancies
Another cluster of objections centers around redundancies. One concern raised
here is whether the consumer protection framework (e.g., the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau [CFPB] or the Federal Trade Commission [FTC]) is already doing
the work of consumer primacy. The CFPB, however, is primarily focused on the
financial sector and homeowner protections. 284 Similarly, the FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection is charged with protecting consumer interests but focuses on
unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent business practices. 285 There are state consumer
protection offices, but they too are focused on protecting victims of fraud, deception,
unfair business practices, and untrue or misleading advertising, pursuant to the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practice Act.286 Nonprofit organizations like the Better
Business Bureau are focused on advancing market trust, which is an important
prerequisite to, but not a substitute for, consumer primacy.287
For the same reason that the SEC and federal and state investor protection
regulations do not negate the need for, but instead coexist with, corporate protections
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of shareholders,288 the availability of consumer protection agencies and regulations
should not be a reason for corporate law to disregard consumer interests.
A second argument about redundancy might stem from the observation that
boards already account for consumer interests in their decision-making process. The
current framework, however, is clearly inadequate. Robert Stringer’s work identifies
the gap that currently exists between perception and reality in the board’s
understanding of the consumer. 289 He cites a survey of 223 senior executives
conducted by Mercer Delta and the Economist Intelligence Unit, which revealed that
52% of executives viewed satisfying customer expectations as one of the top four
business risks they faced.290 In reality, however, an overwhelming majority spent
very little time in board meetings discussing consumers, and most director
respondents indicated that they had little to no direct or even indirect contact with
the business’ consumers.291
Some may argue that the consumer primacy proposal will not have much
impact so long as the business judgment rule is available as a presumptive shield for
directors. Overlaying directors’ fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule is a
judicially created presumption that “in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”292 Under this standard,
directors’ decisions concerning consumers would be protected by the business
judgment rule so long as there is a rational business purpose.293 The challenge with
the business judgment rule is that while it is intended to motivate entrepreneurialism
among directors, it can also act as a cover for bad acts. Furthermore, if duties are
limited or eliminated by contract, consumers have little protection to rely on.
However, again, these criticisms apply to all fiduciary duties, and this occasion to
rewrite and reframe corporate fiduciary duties gives us an opportunity to reconsider
their trade-offs.
5. Competing Interests
Another potential critique of the consumer primacy model is its distributional
consequences. This concern can be addressed by more precisely defining the scope
of consumer-centric business to include only businesses for which there is an
alignment between consumer and societal interest. Furthermore, recent empirical
work in the accounting discipline has demonstrated a positive link between
consumer satisfaction and firm value, suggesting that promotion of consumer
interests is not always in tension with maximization of firm value.294
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Lastly, there may be concerns that consumer primacy interferes with the
contractual bargain reached among stakeholders. The contractarian views corporate
governance as “a complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over
the quasi-rents generated by a firm.”295 One could argue that the consumer primacy
intervention meddles with these contracts. Under this contractarian account,
consumers have agreed to make their contributions and have accepted risks without
requiring equity ownership and associated control rights in exchange therefor.
Accordingly, if this is the bargain that has been reached by parties, should not this
bargain be respected? But if these bargains were reached on the basis of consumers’
naiveté, loyalty, affinity, or hype, we would need to be mindful of the informed
consent and fairness considerations that are essential to contracts. As David Yosifon
explains, even under the contractarian view of firms, “contracting regimes include
pervasive state involvement that can only be justified by a social purpose.”296
V. CONCLUSION: DYNAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In this Article, I have argued that the transition from the industrial to the
postindustrial age requires a corresponding transition from a shareholder primacy
view to a consumer primacy view in the governance of some firms. These firms,
which I refer to as “consumer-centric businesses,” are businesses that have a special
relationship with their consumers, as determined by consumers’ relationships to
stakes, vulnerabilities, and metrics.
For these firms, existing theories and models of the firm must be updated to
regard consumers as one of the principals in the principal-agent model of the firm
and as one of the key stakeholders in the stakeholder model of firms. In support of
this shift, I characterize recent corporate scandals as failures that could have been
averted through a consumer-oriented approach to corporate governance. I also show
how consumers’ integration into corporate governance can be a vehicle to inject
diversity, long-termism, accountability, and social responsibility into the boardroom,
the lack of which has given rise to long-standing critiques of corporate culture in the
United States.
The consumer primacy model proposed in this paper is just one among many
possible models of governance for contemporary firms. A consumer-oriented
strategy is not suitable for every organization for the same reasons that I argue that
a shareholder-oriented strategy is not suitable for every organization. The consumeroriented proposal outlined in this Article is intended as an exposition of one possible
dynamic approach to corporate governance, in which the model of the firm is
adapted to the particularities of each firm (and even for the same firm, across
different periods). A flexible corporate law framework that looks beyond the choice

295

Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 249, 250 (Steven N. Durlauf & L. E. Blume eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
296
Yosifon, supra note 32, at 257 (citing William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 438–39 (1989)).

2022]

CONSUMER PRIMACY

293

of legal form to the substance of a firm’s relationship with its stakeholders could
offer a new pathway to realizing the renewed commitments made by business
leaders toward long-term, collective, and sustainable prosperity.297
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